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121What is it Like to Have an Unconscious Mental State?Philosophical Studies 104 (2): 197-202. 2001.HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state (a `HOS'), either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some champions of HOSTmaintain that the phenomenological character of a sensory stateis induced in it by representing it with a HOS. I argue that thisthesis is vulnerable to overwhelming objections that flow largelyfrom HOST itself. In the process I answer two questions: `What isa plausible sufficient condition for a quale's belonging …Read more
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133Evidential atheismPhilosophical Studies 114 (3). 2003.Here is a new version of the Evidential Problem of Evil.
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33The Human Animal: Personal Identity without PsychologyPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 495-497. 1997.
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785Why there are still no peoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 174-192. 2005.This paper will argue that there are no people. Let me summarize the argument. In part II of what follows, I argue that if identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Psychological connectedness, according to Derek Parfit, is the 'holding of particular direct psychological connections,' for example, when a belief, a desire, or some other psychological feature continues to be had ; psychological connectedness consists in two other relations—rese…Read more
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44Letters to the EditorProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (5). 1992.
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136CORNEA, Scepticism and EvilAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1): 59-70. 2011.
The Principle of Credulity: 'It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary' [Swinburne 1996: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless suffering, theism is impla…Read more -
1558A theory of religion revisedReligious Studies 37 (2): 177-189. 2001.A (revised) account of what all and only religions have in common in virtue of which they are religions.
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49Zombies, Functionalism and QualiaRes Philosophica 99 (1): 91-93. 2022.David Chalmers maintains there is a logically possible world (Z) where we all have physically and functionally identical twins without conscious experiences. Z entails that qualia are extra-physical, hence physicalism is false. I argue that his Zombie Argument (ZA) fails on functionalist grounds. Qualia sometimes affect behavior or they never do. If they do affect behavior, they sometimes individuate functional states; hence my zombie twin cannot be functionally identical to me. To save ZA, we m…Read more
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23Skepticism as a Theory of KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 527-545. 2000.Skepticism about the external world may very well be correct, so the question is in order: what theory of knowledge flows from skepticism itself? The skeptic can give a relatively simple and intuitive account of knowledge by identifying it with indubitable certainty. Our everyday ‘I know that p’ claims, which typically are part of practical projects, deploy the ideal of knowledge to make assertions closely related to, but weaker than, knowledge claims. The truth of such claims is consistent with…Read more
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21Why There Still Are No PeoplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 174-192. 2005.This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminati…Read more
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69Virtueless knowledgePhilosophical Studies 172 (2): 469-475. 2015.This paper argues that reliabilist virtue epistemology is mistaken. Descartes supposes a supremely powerful deceiver is determined to trick him into believing falsehoods. Beliefs Descartes cannot rationally doubt, even allowing the demon’s best efforts, count as indubitable knowledge. I give an instance of indubitable knowledge and argue that it is not attributable to an epistemic competence. Since not all knowledge is virtuous, knowledge cannot be identified with virtuous true belief
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1116Pascal's Wager and the persistent vegetative stateBioethics 21 (2). 2007.I argue that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to the persistent vegetative state with sufficient force that it ought to part of advance directives.
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917Free will as a gift from God: A new compatibilismPhilosophical Studies 92 (3): 257-281. 1998.I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
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1005Contextualism and warranted assertionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1). 2007.Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is K…Read more
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32The Human Animal (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 495-497. 2000.'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human animals, and that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist through time.' Human 'persons' are self-aware human animals which, as they aren't essentially self aware, aren't essentially persons. Ranged against this position is the 'Psychological Approach,' a spectrum of views according to which 'some psychological relation is both necessary and sufficien…Read more
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Identity and DiscernabilityDissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder. 1983.The dissertation is composed of five papers, each of which either deals with a topic in contemporary metaphysics or uses concepts central to contemporary metaphysics as part of the machinery of its argument. Three papers deal with the problem of personal identity. In Hume on Identity: A Defense I argue that Hume, in maintaining that we are always mistaken in ascribing identity to persons, is presenting a fundamental metaphysical problem about identity through change, not trying to analyze the wa…Read more
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1074Advance directives, autonomy and unintended deathBioethics 8 (3). 1994.Advance directives typically have two defects. First, most advance directives fail to enable people to effectively avoid unwanted medical intervention. Second, most of them have the potential of ending your life in ways you never intended, years before you had to die.
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208Why counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatibleAnalysis 69 (4): 650-653. 2009.I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the ‘liberty of indifference’: whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. L…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Applied Ethics |