Joao Fabiano

If we accept both that human enhancement could produce beings with higher moral status than our own (i.e. supra-persons), and that this scenario may be detrimental to unenhanced persons, then there are still several ways that the creation of supra-persons could be defended. I will argue that some of these defences fail. Their justification for the permissibility or unlikelihood of harms to the unenhanced is weakened once we consider that those who enhance may be undermining their own individual interests. Enhancements that are substantial enough to increase moral status may also be substantial enough to affect psychological continuity. Certain individual interests are sensitive to loses of psychological continuity. I will consider three scenarios: the creation of supra-persons within one generation, the enhancement of persons into supra-persons, and the generational replacement of persons by supra-persons. The arguments for the first scenario fail on intuitive grounds. A thorough consideration of individual interests undermines the arguments for the other two scenarios. I conclude that although the creation of drastically morally better persons may be desirable and likely to help realise most of what we currently value, this realisation is undermined by the fact that the beings enjoying this future scenario might not be our psychological continuants.

I will argue that deep moral enhancement is relatively prone to unexpected consequences. I first argue that even an apparently straightforward example of moral enhancement such as increasing human co-operation could plausibly lead to unexpected harmful effects. Secondly, I generalise the example and argue that technological intervention on individual moral traits will often lead to paradoxical effects on the group level. Thirdly, I contend that insofar as deep moral enhancement targets higher-order desires, it is prone to be self-reinforcing and irreversible. Fourthly, I argue that the complex causal history of moral traits, with its relatively high frequency of contingencies, indicates their fragility. Finally, I conclude that attempts at deep moral enhancement pose greater risks than other enhancement technologies. For example, one of the major problems that moral enhancement is hoped to address is lack of co-operation between groups. If humanity developed and distributed a drug that dramatically increased co-operation between individuals, we would likely see a paradoxical decrease in co-operation between groups and a self-reinforcing increase in the disposition to engage in further modifications – both of which are potential problems.

Many would intuitively agree with the claim that human morality is complex. I will formalise this claim, give three strong reasons for believing in it, address objections and tentatively list consequences of the unusual complexity of human morality. I will argue that a proper account of human moral traits will have an unusually large degree of complexity. I will present as support for this claim the intricate causal history of moral traits, their propensity to paradoxical effects and various epistemic difficulties. The complexity of human morality has bleak consequences for hopes of manipulating our moral traits using biomedical interventions, be it in the treatment of diseases or in the prospect of fixing our moral failings.

Our present moral traits are unable to provide the level of large-scale co-operation necessary to deal with risks such as nuclear proliferation, drastic climate change and pandemics. In order to survive in an environment with powerful and easily available technologies, some authors claim that we need to improve our moral traits with moral enhancement. But this is prone to produce paradoxical effects, be self-reinforcing and harm personal identity. The risks of moral enhancement require the use of a safety framework; such a framework should guarantee practical robustness to moral uncertainty, empirical adequacy, correct balance between dispositions, preservation of identity, and be sensitive to practical considerations such as emergent social effects. A virtue theory can meet all these desiderata. Possible frameworks incorporate them to variable degrees. The social value orientations framework is one of the most promising candidates.

A new argument has been made against moral enhancement by authors who are otherwise in favour of human enhancement. Additionally, they share the same evolutionary toolkit for analysing human traits as well as the belief that our current morality is unfit to deal with modern problems, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The argument is put forward by Buchanan and Powell and states that other paths to moral progress are enough to deal with these problems. Given the likely costs and risks involved with developing moral enhancement, this argument implies moral enhancement is an unpromising enterprise. After mentioning proposed solutions to such modern problems, I will argue that moral enhancement would help implement any of them. I will then detail Buchanan and Powell’s new argument disfavouring moral enhancement and argue that it makes too bold assumptions about the efficacy of traditional moral progress. For instance, it overlooks how that progress was to achieve even in relatively successful cases such as the abolition of slavery. Traditional moral progress is likely to require assistance from non-traditional means in order to face new challenges.

Certain problems with standard two-dimensional semantics are addressed and cases in which these problems arise explored. In such cases the primary intension cannot be univocally mapped in one and only one indexical world, thus standard two-dimensional semantics cannot efficiently address the problems presented. Subsequently, a modified model is presented which leads these problems to be averted in the replicated cases. This modified model admits primary intensions that are not univocally mapped. The conclusion discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the modified model and analyzes its possible consequences for the philosophy of mind.

How individuals tend to evaluate the combination of their own and other’s payoffs—social value orientations—is likely to be a potential target of future moral enhancers. However, the stability of cooperation in human societies has been buttressed by evolved mildly prosocial orientations. If they could be changed, would this destabilize the cooperative structure of society? We simulate a model of moral enhancement in which agents play games with each other and can enhance their orientations based on maximizing personal satisfaction. We find that given the assumption that very low payoffs lead agents to be removed from the population, there is a broadly stable prosocial attractor state. However, the balance between prosociality and individual payoff-maximization is affected by different factors. Agents maximizing their own satisfaction can produce emergent shifts in society that reduce everybody’s satisfaction. Moral enhancement considerations should take the issues of social emergence into account.