Joe Saunders

Some Kantians argue that freedom is not a metaphysical property that we might or might not possess, but instead an idea or presupposition that we must adopt from the practical standpoint. In doing so, they look to secure our freedom, no matter what science or theoretical reason reveals about us. This paper lays out two problems for this position. The problems are both metaphysical and epistemic. The metaphysical issues are that conceiving of freedom as an idea or presupposition that we must adopt from the practical standpoint makes it especially difficult to account for _interaction_ between freedom and experience, but also why some things occupy a practical standpoint where others do not. The epistemic issue is that the standpoint view struggles to account for _knowledge_ of freedom in experience. I contend that these problems are decisive, and that we should abandon the standpoint view of freedom.

This paper lays out one positive role that humour can play in intimate relationships, focusing on the value of not taking oneself too seriously. It begins by looking at the positive value of humour in general (Section I), before applying this to intimate relationships (Section II). In doing so, it draws upon a general account of the value of humour, which claims that humour can defuse our fight or flight responses, and help us see ourselves honestly as others do. I make the case that both of these are beneficial in intimate relationships, as spaces where we can be safe and accepted for the particular individuals we are. Not taking ourselves too seriously, I argue, can help us cultivate vulnerability, trust, safety, and acceptance together.

This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental idealism. And the third is to reject both Kant's claim about the timelessness of freedom and also transcendental idealism itself.

Both Kant and James claim to limit the role of knowledge in order to make room for faith. In this paper, we argue that despite some similarities, their attempts to do this come apart. Our main claim is that, although both Kant and James justify our adopting religious beliefs on practical grounds, James believes that we can—and should—subsequently assess such beliefs on the basis of evidence. We offer our own account of this evidence and discuss what this difference means for their accounts of religious belief.