Johanna Holbrook

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Lyotard and Greek Thought: SophistryJ. Britt HolbrookKeith Crome. Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pp. x + 186. Cloth, $68.00.Caveat lector: this deceptively short work presents an exercise in genre-bending (the sophistical retorsion of the philosophical determination of sophistry) that may leave one's head spinning, particularly if one's acquaintance with the thought of Jean-François Lyotard is not quite up to snuff. One may perhaps take the appearance of such a work—written by a Lyotard scholar for Lyotard scholars—as a sign that Lyotard has finally arrived. (Arrive-t-il? But, Lyotard has already arrived! Didn't you read Keith Crome's book?) Be forewarned: unless you "got" that parenthetical joke, wait to read this book until after you have read (or re-read) at the very least Lyotard's Just Gaming and The Differend.More "sophisticated" readers of Lyotard, however, will warmly welcome this book. Along with a helpful review of secondary literature on Lyotard, the Introduction offers a compelling case for the need for an extended treatment of Lyotard's relation to Greek thought—sophistry in particular. The work sets for itself two goals: (1) to show that Lyotard's engagement with sophistry plays a key role in the development of his notion of the differend; and (2) to show that Lyotard attempts to define the limits of philosophy qua philosophy in terms of its relation to sophistry.It is this second, larger, goal that presents the main problem for the work. Because the argument "attempts to show that Lyotard wrests sophistry from the traditional philosophical understanding it has enjoyed and that by way of this effects a delimitation of philosophy [End Page 676] itself" (10), Part I ("The Place of Sophistry in Philosophy") offers accounts of traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry from Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. Essential to the success of Crome's argument is the idea that what all traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry share is both a refusal to allow sophistry to define itself and a tendency to define philosophy around and against sophistry (83). The "radicality" of Lyotard's interpretation of sophistry, according to Part II ("Lyotard and the Sophistication of Philosophy"), consists in Lyotard's refusal to allow philosophy to define sophistry and a retorsion—a turning against philosophy and for sophistry—of the philosophical tendency to define itself around and against sophistry. Crome's point exceeds the claim that, whereas traditional philosophical interpretations of sophistry have invariably given sophistry a bad rap, Lyotard attempts to redress the balance and to restore the reputation of sophistry. According to Crome, Lyotard's "restoration" of sophistry to itself also puts philosophy in its place, by showing that the traditional philosophical tendency to define philosophy around and against sophistry is merely reactive—in particular, insofar as Lyotard shows that the initial move in the traditional philosophical interpretation of sophistry is motivated by a reaction against Gorgias' nihilistic reading of Parmenides' Poem (129–45).Although some may wish to quibble over individual details, overall Crome's argument is quite successful in showing that Lyotard's engagement with sophistry plays a key role in the development of his notion of the differend. It is with his second, larger goal—to show that Lyotard attempts to define the limits of philosophy as philosophy in terms of its relation to sophistry—that most readers will find something of substance with which to quarrel. Crome's interpretation of Lyotard's analysis of the sophistical "technique" —one might prefer 'manner,' in the Kantian sense—of retorsion (95–100) and its role in the development of the notion of the differend borders on brilliant; yet the insertion into that interpretation of the "ontological significance" of Lyotard's analysis (8–9, 147, 161) seems forced. In order to "broaden the significance" of Lyotard's work amongst critics, is it really necessary to attribute an "ontological significance" to The Differend? Does one really "broaden the significance" of the differend by claiming that it is "the name for a sophistical logos" (162)? Is developing a strategy to bear witness to the differend in itself insignificant? Some will balk.Nevertheless, readers of Lyotard...