•  25
    Conceivability and Possibility
    Mind 113 (450): 347-351. 2004.
  • Editorial
    with Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins and Crispin Wright
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 79-80. 2012.
  •  6
    with Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins and Crispin Wright
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 159-160. 2012.
  •  5
    with Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins and Crispin Wright
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4): 251-251. 2014.
  •  124
    (Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality
    Synthese 197 (11): 4645-4668. 2020.
    We propose a novel interpretation of Lewis on the analysis of modality that is constructed from primary sources, comprehensive and unprecedented. Our guiding precepts are to distinguish semantics from metaphysics, while respecting the inter-relations between them, and to discern whatever may be special, semantically or metaphysically, about the modal case. Following detailed presentation, we amplify and advocate our interpretation by providing a conforming genealogy of Lewis’s theory of modality…Read more
  •  240
    Manifesting belief in absolute necessity
    Philosophical Studies 158 (1): 109-130. 2012.
    McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we ex…Read more
  •  3
    with Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins and Crispin Wright
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4): 253-253. 2012.
  •  5
    with Crispin Wright
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 1-3. 2012.
  •  20
    Realism and Truth
    Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180): 387-389. 1995.
  •  4
    with Crispin Wright and Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4): 281-281. 2013.
  •  18
    The interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Everett (1957) postulates the existence of many worlds. The analysis of modality due to Lewis (1986) is supported.
  • Modal anti-realism
    In Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality, Routledge. 2018.
  •  37
    Recent Work On Supervenience (review)
    Philosophical Books 39 (2): 81-91. 1998.
    At the core of the concept of supervenience are certain general maxims— notably, that there can be no A-differences without B-differences and that Bindiscernibility must bring A-discernibility. Supervenience is thus conceived as a matter of modal covariance between two sets of things in a given category, usually properties. The perennial issues surrounding supervenience concern: (a) the variety of specifically formulated theses that serve the core maxims and the patterns of entailment that obtai…Read more
  •  43
    _ The Nature of Contingency _: _ Quantum Physics as Modal Realism _, by AlastairWilson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 219.
  •  49
    How Skeptical Is Quine’s “Modal Skepticism”?
    The Monist 100 (2): 194-210. 2017.
  • The modal metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga
    In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
  •  200
    W(h)ither Metaphysical Necessity?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1): 1-25. 2018.
    I argue that a pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain. I then illustrate the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for defeating such scepticism. These strategies appeal to associations between metaphysical modality and the following: objective probability, counterfactuals and distinctive explanatory value.
  •  22
    Substance Among Other Categories
    Philosophical Books 37 (1): 52-53. 1996.
  •  38
    Philosophical Issues from Kripke’s ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (1): 1-44. 2016.
    Kripke; possible-world semantics; pure and applied semantics; models of modal space; applicability.
  •  128
    Minimalism and the unbearable lightness of being
    with Alexander Miller
    Philosophical Papers 24 (2): 127-139. 1995.
    No abstract
  •  110
    Genuine modal realism: Still limited
    with Joseph Melia
    Mind 115 (459): 731-740. 2006.
    In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Pasea…Read more
  •  83
    Supervenience for operators
    Synthese 106 (1): 103-12. 1996.
      The modal primitivist who takes a sentential possibility operator as her only modal resource can provide adequate representations of the familiar concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience. The primitivist representations of these concepts can be applied to provide adequate interpretations of speciflc supervenience theses which will be considered. Moreover the modal primitivist is no better and no worse placed than the genuine modal realist to present supervenience as a simple and unifl…Read more
  •  155
    A modal fictionalist result
    Noûs 33 (3): 317-346. 1999.
  •  126
    The Analysis of Possibility and the Extent of Possibility
    Dialectica 67 (2): 183-200. 2013.
    In section 1 I motivate and execute the presentation of a well-defined Lewisian conception of analysis and of what it would be to analyse modality successfully. That conception is then put to two applications. In section 2 various inadequacies are exposed in a (recently popular) separatist approach to the understanding and/or evaluation of Lewis's analysis of modality. Section 3 provides a defence against a resilient argument for the claim that Lewis's analysis of modality cannot be fully reduct…Read more
  •  410
    If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. Or …Read more
  •  6
    Modal Commitments
    In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    This chapter has three principal aims. Firstly, to promote interest in the question of the function, or utility, of judgements of modality. Secondly, to endorse an alternative to orthodox contemporary methodology, advocating that we prioritize the question of function in modal philosophy. Thirdly, to consider among our modal judgements exactly which are the proper and exact source of various different kinds of substantial philosophical commitments in ontology, epistemology, and elsewhere. An ill…Read more