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76Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experiencePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2): 421-434. 2020.Perceptual constancy, often defined as the perception of stable features under changing conditions, goes hand in hand with variation in how things look. A white wall in the orange afternoon sun still looks white, though its whiteness looks different compared with the same wall in the noon sun. Historically, this variation has often been explained in terms of our experience of “merely sensory” or subjective properties – an approach at odds with the fact that the variation does track objective fea…Read more
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46A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of QualiaAnnals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2): 81-93. 2007.Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we ar…Read more
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145The indexical nature of sensory conceptsPhilosophical Papers 32 (2): 169-181. 2002.This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first-person indexical. It is argued that the private nature of our access to our own sensations forces, in our talking about them, an indexical reference to the inner states of the speaker in lieu of publicly accessible properties by which reference is usually fixed. Indexicals, such as ‘here’, can be understood despite ignorance of their referent. Such is the case with sensory terms. Furthermore, the thesis t…Read more
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38Frank Cameron JacksonIn Graham Robert Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner & Fiona Leigh (eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand, Monash University Publishing. 2011.Entry for the Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand.
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287A Proprioceptive Account of the SensesIn Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press Usa. 2011.Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by pu…Read more
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724Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problemPhilosophical Studies 130 (2): 285-95. 2006.The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationali…Read more
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107The value in equal opportunity: Reply to KershnarJournal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2). 2007.Stephen Kershnar (2004) recently argues that under its most plausible interpretation, equality of opportunity is simply not something worth pursuing; at least, not for itself. In this paper I try to show that even if we accept Kershnar's characterisation of equality of opportunity in terms of weighted aggregate chances, none of his objections succeed. Opportunities, not outcomes, are the appropriate focus of EO advocates; hedonic treadmills are irrelevant to the issue; we do not need to assume g…Read more
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195Transparency and the unity of experienceIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 299. 2008.If we assume that the operation of each sense modality constitutes a different experience – a visual experience, an auditory experience, etc – we are faced with the problem of how those distinct experiences come together to form a unified perceptual encounter with the world. Michael Tye has recently argued that the best way to get around this problem is to deny altogether that there are such things as purely visual (and so forth) experiences. Here I aim to show not simply that Tye’s proposed sol…Read more
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1101Art and Ambiguity: A Gestalt-Shift Approach to Elusive AppearancesIn Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence, Oxford University Press. 2018.I defend a solution to a long-standing problem with perceptual appearances, brought about by the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. The problem is that in conditions which are non-ideal, yet within the range that perceptual constancy works, we see things veridically despite an “appearance” which is traditionally taken to be non-veridical. For example, a tilted coin is often taken to have an “elliptical appearance”, shadowed surfaces a “darker appearance”. These appearances are puzzling for a nu…Read more
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University of TokyoProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |
PhilPapers Editorships
Perceptual Constancy |