• La Filosofía del Lenguaje en España
    Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico 5 59-66. 2000.
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    ¿Por qué hablar de la mente?
    Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2): 67-81. 2006.
    Attempting to escape from the substantialist cartesian dualism, some take our conceptual schemes as dualist. Thus, Feigl makes the distinction between the mental and the physical from an epistemological viewpoint, accepting as distinctive of the mental a direct and immediate knowledge which has no place in the physical, but however he accepts the identity between mental states and neurological states. In a similar way, Davidson, stating that all events are physical, characterizes the mental as a…Read more
  • What is mental?
    Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 32 (2): 5-16. 2007.