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The philosophy of luck and experimental philosophyIn Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, Routledge. 2019.
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20Prudence, Rules, and Regulative EpistemologyPhilosophies 8 (5): 91. 2023.Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogo…Read more
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4Subject‐Involving LuckIn Duncan Pritchard & Lee John Whittington (eds.), The Philosophy of Luck, Wiley-blackwell. 2015.In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ——. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should unders…Read more
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8SIEGEL, HARVEY, Education’s Epistemology: Rationality, Diversity, and Critical Thinking, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, 304 pp (review)Anuario Filosófico 398-401. 2018.
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532Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological DisjunctivismIn Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, Routledge. 2019.In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.
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24Newman’s Skeptical ParadoxAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1): 105-123. 2020.John Henry Newman starts the second half of the Grammar of Assent by laying out a “paradox,” and he announces that the purpose of the following chapters of the book is to resolve it. Surprisingly, recent scholarship has tended not to question the nature of this paradox. In this paper, I argue that we should understand Newman’s paradox to be a kind of skeptical paradox that arises when we accept “Lockean rationalism.” I then show how Newman deals with the paradox. One of the upshots of this readi…Read more
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University of Notre DamePost-doctoral fellow
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America