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1654Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gapPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October): 354-61. 1983.
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661The modal status of materialismPhilosophical Studies 145 (3). 2009.Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
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456On Leaving Out What It's LikeIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays, Mit Press. pp. 543--557. 1993.
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349Conscious awareness and representationIn Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 173--198. 2006.
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266The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomismPhilosophical Review 119 (3): 365-380. 2010.Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) be…Read more
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255Purple Haze: The Puzzle of ConsciousnessOxford University Press USA. 2001.In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
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243Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality MeetThe Monist 91 (2): 215-236. 2008.
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241Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of AppearingDialectica 60 (3): 269-282. 2006.In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I …Read more
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219Conceivability and the metaphysics of mindNoûs 32 (4): 449-480. 1998.Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists i…Read more
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165Knowing what it's likeIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. 2003.
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159On the Phenomenology of ThoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 103. 2011.
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155Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraintIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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154Review: Daniel Stoljar: Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (review)Mind 117 (465): 228-231. 2008.
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149Experience and representationIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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109Demonstrative ConceptsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 328-336. 2008.Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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103Phenomenal consciousness and the first-personPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from wh…Read more
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101On the Meta-ProblemJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 148-159. 2019.According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Unfortunately, I think there are still some serious mysteries lurking here, which I present briefly in this commentary. In particular, on the view of acquaintance I favour, it …Read more
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99Intentional ChemistryGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1): 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more
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91Matters of mind: Consciousness, reason, and nature Scott SturgeonBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 629-634. 2001.
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84Recent work on consciousnessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 379-404. 1997.This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made