Joshua Sijuwade

This article offers a plausible metaphysical framework to address the Apocalyptic Visionary Challenge stemming from the work of Bart Ehrman and Dale Allison. Their research suggests Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet whose specific predictions seemingly failed and whose resurrection appearances parallel common apparitional experiences. These findings challenge traditional Christian beliefs regarding Jesus’ divine nature and the objective reality of his resurrection appearances. To address this dual challenge, the article presents a model involving hypertime and hyperspace. While theoretical, this model aims to provide a coherent and plausible account, moving beyond mere logical possibility, to affirm Jesus’ divinity and the objective nature of his resurrection appearances within a philosophically informed, historical-critical context.

The central focus of this article is resolving the ‘Ontological Subordination Problem’, produced by a joint affirmation of the aseity of a divine being and the doctrines of eternal generation and the monarchy of the Father, which are central to Conciliar Trinitarianism, through a reformulated Intrinsicality Solution. By applying Gene Witmer’s Simple Theory of Intrinsicality, this article argues that aseity is an extrinsic rather than intrinsic property—and is able to do so without being subject to the objections raised against the original Intrinsicality Solution that is grounded on Rae Langton and David Lewis’ combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality. This reformulation reconciles the doctrines of eternal generation and the monarchy of the Father with the ontological equality of the divine persons, thus addressing a key tension in Trinitarian thought.

This chapter focuses on how contemporary analytic theology uses metaphysical models to clarify the doctrine of the Incarnation. It examines three main categories of models—compositional versus transformational, abstract versus concrete nature, and two-part versus three-part theories—exploring how each seeks to explain Christ as one person with two complete natures without fragmenting his personhood or conflating his natures. The chapter identifies key philosophical problems confronting these models, including the Nestorian Problem, the Attributes Problem, and the Assumption Problem, and evaluates solutions proposed by scholars such as Leftow, Hasker, Swinburne, Loke, and Sijuwade. It concludes that metaphysical modelling provides valuable conceptual resources for understanding the Incarnation while maintaining orthodox Christology.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which a ‘trope-theoretic’ version of Theism is a better theory than that of a theory of Atheism, as posited by Graham Oppy. This end will be achieved by utilising the systemisation of the theoretical virtues proposed by Michael Keas (as further modified by an application of the work of Jonathan Schaffer), the notion of a trope, introduced by D.C. Williams, and an aspect, proposed by Donald L.M. Baxter, which will establish the basis of the trope-theoretic account of Theism that will be at the centre of our analysis. This assessment will ultimately show that Theism, rather than that of Atheism (Naturalism), can successfully achieve the trade-off between minimising theoretical commitments and maximising explanatory power. And thus, given this, the best theory of Theism—namely, that of ‘trope-theoretic Theism’—is to be privileged over that of the best theory of Atheism—namely, that of ‘Oppyian Naturalism’—and is able to provide grounds for a decisive reassessment of the cogency of Agnosticism.

This article aims to provide a philosophical argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism, which is the teaching that there is one God, the Father, and two, relationally distinct, divine persons, the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousious (i.e., of the same substance, nature, and/or essence) with the Father, through the causal theory of reference developed by Saul Kripke and Gareth Evans. A deductive argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism (formally known as 'Monarchical' Trinitarianism) is proposed, termed the 'Semantic Argument', which enables one to affirm the veracity of this position, and also preserve monotheism and divine equality, while avoiding modalism and tri-theism altogether. This is that, the article demonstrates that if the proper name 'God' was baptismally fixed to the Father through Scripture and the first two ecumenical councils (with further ratification being made by the other five ecumenical councils), then any attempt to apply this same proper name nominatively to the Son or Spirit creates what I term the ‘Trinitarian Dilemma’, which is an unavoidable choice between modalistic collapse and tri-theistic fragmentation. Common (‘Egalitarian’) Trinitarian approaches, including social models and Latin Trinitarian strategies, face this dilemma inescapably, and so the solution thus lies in adopting Conciliar Trinitarianism and, therefore, recognising that the Father alone bears 'God' as a proper name (as the dominant source of the Godhead), while the Son and Spirit are called 'God' predicatively (by virtue of possessing the divine substance, nature and or essence) or metonymically (as perfect representatives of the Father). This semantic framework thus successfully preserves both the full equality of all three Trinitarian persons and the strict monotheism confessed by the Church

This article introduces and explores the ethical theory of Robust Exemplarist Natural Law, which is a combination of John Finnis’s Natural Law Theory and Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory within the framework of Robust Realism proposed by David Enoch and Russ Shafer-Landau. It aims to integrate moral realism’s objective truths with the notion of basic goods and the principles of practical reasonableness, with the influence of moral exemplars on belief and behaviour formation. In achieving this end, a robust ethical framework will be provided, which is able to ward off the various issues that can be raised against the individual theoretical components of it, and a particular theistic extension of the theory will be provided, which applies the central components of it within a theistic context.

This article aims to elucidate Conciliar Trinitarianism, the teaching that, in the Trinity, there exists one God, the Father, and two relationally distinct divine persons: the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousios with (i.e. of same substance as) the Father, through the novel metaphysical framework (or model) of Conciliar Aspectivalism. By integrating complex concepts from contemporary metaphysics, Conciliar Aspectivalism provides a coherent and philosophically robust framework for expressing the central tenets of Conciliar Trinitarianism in a way, however, that preserves fundamentality of the one God, the Father, and the absolute unity and singularity of the divine substance that is equally shared by the Trinitarian persons. Hence, through this elucidation, Conciliar Aspectivalism offers a unique perspective for understanding and articulating the core teaching of the Trinitarianism that is expressed by the Seven Ecumenical Councils within a metaphysically coherent framework.

This article aims to provide a reassessment of the relationship between God and abstract objects. This reassessment will provide a new conceptualisation of this important relationship and will be formulated, first, within the theoretical framework of ‘Theistic Aspectivalism’, which is grounded on the notion of an aspect, proposed by Donald L.M. Baxter, which provides a means to ward off the ‘Bootstrapping Problem’. Second, within the theoretical framework of ‘Theistic Essentialism’, which is based on the notion of essence and essential dependence, as proposed by Kit Fine, Jonathan Lowe, and Katherin Koslicki, which provides a metaphysical basis for the relationship between God and abstract objects to be further elucidated and for the position of 'Platonic Theism' to be free from the primary issues that are often raised against it.

This article offers a critical response to Richard Swinburne's “The Free Will of a Sinless Incarnate God”. Swinburne addresses an apparent contradiction in traditional Christology: how Christ can possess a human nature, including genuine free will, while being necessarily sinless. After reviewing Swinburne's proposed solution - that Christ was predetermined not to sin but still experienced genuine temptation - I develop an objection based on Kane's libertarian theory of free will. I argue that genuine human freedom necessarily involves Self-Forming Actions where alternative possibilities, including the possibility to sin, are genuinely available. Since Christ, on Swinburne's account, lacks this capacity, he cannot possess genuine human freedom and thus lacks an essential component of human nature. I propose the Dispositional Incarnation Model as the most robust solution to this dilemma, as it allows Christ to possess genuine libertarian freedom at the occurrent level of his human experience while securing his sinlessness through his divine nature dispositionally exemplified. This, rather than the solution proposed by Swinburne, provides the conceptual basis for one affirming the traditional Chalcedonian claim that Christ is “perfect in humanity” and “like us in all respects except for sin”.

This article focuses on providing a new a priori argument for the veracity of the doctrine of the Incarnation. This new argument, called the Subjectivity Argument, will be formulated in light of the concept of "omnisubjectivity," as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, and an "emotion," as conceptualised by the "somatic feeling theory," posited by Jesse Prinz. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessity of the Incarnation, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that can be raised against other a priori arguments for the Incarnation in the contemporary literature.

An invited talk delivered at the Logos Institute of Analytic Theology at the University of St Andrews. The topic was on the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. I sought to introduce my solution to the logical challenge against the doctrine of the incarnation and also my own metaphysical model of the incarnation (called the transformational model). This talk summarises my article on this topic published previously in IJPR (termed 'On the metaphysics of the incarnation'). Handouts for the talk are included in the file.

This article aims to provide an explication of a new conceptualisation of God's defeat of horrors (i.e., horror-defeat), and a successful solution to the Problem of Horrors—which we can term the ‘Reconciliation Account’. This specific conceptualisation will be formulated in light of the work of Marilyn McCord Adams, with an original extension of her work being made by utilising the work of Richard Swinburne and Robin Collins (amongst others), which, in combination, will provide us with a more robust solution to the issue raised by horrors.

This book explores and develops a new philosophical argument for the existence of God from metaphysics. It focuses on exploring the pressing questions of God's existence, the truth of theistic belief, and its relevance in modern philosophy. In doing so, it bridges the discussions and debates in the field of contemporary metaphysics with that of analytic philosophy of religion. At its core, metaphysics is dedicated to unveiling the fundamental structure of reality, playing a critical role in any intellectual endeavour in the quest for truth. However, a noticeable gap has persisted between today's metaphysical conversations and the debates in analytic philosophy of religion, especially regarding the topic of God's existence. In this book, the author embarks on a rigorous exploration, presenting an innovative a posteriori argument for theism, rooted in the latest evidence and theories from contemporary metaphysics. The first part of the book details the explanatory framework of the analysis, which is focussed on introducing a new abductive methodology within metaphysics that provides a way for assessing the veracity of the Theism and the leading fundamental theories in contemporary metaphysics. The second part of the book then focuses on demonstrating how the central concepts and theories within contemporary metaphysics-such as quantum foundations, four-dimensionalism, formal ontology, essentialism, grounding, powerful causation, mereology, free will, personhood and the reality of suffering-are best explained by the existence of God, and thus justify theism, over that of the competing theories within contemporary metaphysics. Theism is thus the best working metaphysical theory and should take a central place in fundamental enquiries within the field of contemporary metaphysics and beyond. Analytic Theism: A Philosophical Investigation is a must-read for scholars and advanced students venturing into philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Beyond its appeal to those in analytic philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this work also resonates with those immersed in contemporary philosophy on a whole, and related fields of inquiry, serving as a pivotal read for anyone keen on the intersections of philosophy, theology, and science.

This article aims to provide a theory of atonement, termed the "Agápēic Theory," which is formulated within a philosophical framework that has the aim of humans flourishing to the maximum level through partaking in an everlasting relationship of love with God. The Agápēic Theory will be formulated by using a certain conception of love, introduced by Alexander Pruss, into the field of applied ethics, and also various elements from other existing theories of the Atonement found within the fields of analytic theology, in the work of Richard Swinburne, Eleonore Stump and Robin Collins, and systematic/biblical theology, in the work of Karl Barth and N.T Wright, which will both help to ground the Agápēic Theory on firm philosophical and theological grounds and ultimately provide a robust theory of the Atonement.

This article seeks to provide a response to the Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism proposed by Joseph C. Schmid and Ryan T. Mullins. This response focuses on showing the unsoundness of the argument once the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity is reformulated within the essentialist aspectival framework provided by the Aspectival Account. Formulating a response to this argument will thus also serve the further purpose of providing an extension of the Aspectival Account and a needed revision of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity, which can aid others in their quest to further clarify the nature of this doctrine.

This article aims to provide a new ontological argument for the existence of God. A specific ‘modal’ version of the ontological argument—termed the Modal Realist Ontological Argument—is formulated within the modal realist metaphysical framework of David K. Lewis, Kris McDaniel and Philip Bricker. Formulating this argument within this specific framework will enable the plausibility of its central premise (i.e., the ‘Possibility Premise’) to be established, and allow one to affirm the soundness of the argument—whilst warding off two oft-raised objections against this type of natural theological argument.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.