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164Feminizing the City: Plato on Women, Masculinity, and ThumosHypatia 1-24. 2024.This paper responds to two trends in debates about Plato's view of women in the Republic. First, many scholars argue or assume that Plato seeks to minimize the influence of femininity in the ideal city, and to make guardian women themselves as “masculine” as possible. Second, scholars who address the relationship between Plato's views of women and his psychological theory tend to focus on the reasoning and appetitive parts of the tripartite soul. In response to the first point, we argue that the…Read more
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22The Political Soul: Plato on Thumos, Spirited Motivation, and the CityOxford University Press. 2021.Josh Wilburn examines the relationship between Plato's views on psychology and his political philosophy. Focusing on his reflections on the spirited part of the tripartite soul, or thumos, and spirited motivation, he explores the social and political challenges that occupy Plato throughout his works.
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27Renaut Platon. La médiation des émotions: l'éducation du Thymos dans les dialogues. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2014. Pp. 376. €38. 9782711625307 (review)Journal of Hellenic Studies 136 284-285. 2016.
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138Courage and the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato’s RepublicPhilosophers' Imprint 15. 2015.In this paper I examine the account of courage offered in Books 3 and 4 of the Republic and consider its relation to the account of courage and cowardice found in the final argument of the Protagoras. I defend two main lines of thought. The first is that in the Republic Plato does not abandon the Protagoras’ view that all cases of cowardice involve mistaken judgment or ignorance about what is fearful. Rather, he continues to treat cowardly behavior as an indication that, at least at the time of …Read more
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12Sandra Peterson , Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 31 (6): 449-451. 2011.
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6183The Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato’s TimaeusJournal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4): 627-652. 2014.In the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and most imp…Read more
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1454Moral education and the spirited part of the soul in Plato's lawsOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45 63. 2013.In this paper I argue that although the Republic’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the Laws, it continues to inform the Laws from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, I argue that the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the Laws (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). I examine the programs of musical and gymnastic education in the Laws a…Read more
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21Rachel Barney, Ted Brennan, and Charles Brittain, eds. , Plato and the Divided Self . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 32 (6): 439-442. 2012.
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785Plato's Protagoras the HedonistClassical Philology 113 (3): 224-244. 2016.I advocate an ad hominem reading of the hedonism that appears in the final argument of the Protagoras. I that attribute hedonism both to the Many and to Protagoras, but my focus is on the latter. I argue that the Protagoras in various ways reflects Plato’s view that the sophist is an inevitable advocate for, and himself implicitly inclined toward, hedonism, and I show that the text aims through that characterization to undermine Protagoras’ status as an educator. One of my objectives in the cour…Read more
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568Tripartition and the Causes of Criminal Behavior in Laws ixAncient Philosophy 33 (1): 111-134. 2013.In this paper I argue that, despite what many commentators have concluded, Plato’s division of three psychological “causes” of criminal behavior at Laws 863b1-e3 (anger, pleasure, and ignorance) is not intended to invoke the tripartite theory of the soul. I suggest that the focus of the division is on an alternative moral psychological picture, one which is better suited to the criminal penology of Book 9. However, I argue, this alternative picture is nonetheless consistent with tripartite theor…Read more
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1015Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato's LawsOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43 25-53. 2012.In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as a virtuous condition of the soul (and lack of self-r…Read more
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913The Problem of Alcibiades: Plato on Moral Education and the ManyOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49 1-36. 2015.Socrates’ admirers and successors in the fourth century and beyond often felt the need to explain Socrates’ reputed relationship with Alcibiades, and to defend Socrates against the charge that he was a corrupting influence on Alcibiades. In this paper I examine Plato’s response to this problem and have two main aims. First, I will argue in Section 2 that <span class></span>
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633Is Appetite Ever 'Persuaded'?: An Alternative Reading of Republic 554c-dHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3). 2014.Republic 554c-d—where the oligarchic individual is said to restrain his appetites ‘by compulsion and fear’, rather than by persuasion or by taming them with speech—is often cited as evidence that the appetitive part of the soul can be ‘persuaded’. I argue that the passage does not actually support that conclusion. I offer an alternative reading and suggest that appetite, on Plato’s view, is not open to persuasion.
Detroit, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |