Jules Coleman

It is not clear to me that there is any longer the institutional will to train students, as both Henry and I were trained, in the languages, histories and philosophies that enable one to approach the texts of classical, medieval and renaissance intellectual history in particular. Today a student who is drawn to a study of pre-modern ideas and historical settings will be asked why on earth such an irrelevant subject matter should attract any interest or indeed, funding. Even in Politics Departments there has been a tendency to keep alive only small pockets of normative theorists who have neither interest in nor knowledge of the history of their own discipline or of the languages they use with such confidence. For this reason, I want to say something about what I take to be the importance of studying the history of political thought in a modern university, because I think that we are gradually losing sight of a range of ways of thinking and speaking that will have, and is already having, dire consequences for the more everyday world we live in

This book is an interdisciplinary study of the fundamental normative issues underpinning immigration policy. Economists, political scientists and philosophers address issues such as the proper role of the state in supporting a particular culture, the possible destabilization of the political and social life of a country through immigration, the size and distribution of economic losses and gains, and the legitimacy of discriminating against potential immigrants in favour of members of the resident population. The need for serious philosophical consideration of this subject is beyond question. This volume should advance discussion in an area of great practical as well as philosophical importance.

An extraordinary collection of the finest essays in the core areas of legal philosophy, Readings in Philosophy of Law is a perfect introduction to the breadth of issues covered in the philosophy of law. The essays are all classic papers chosen as much for their clarity of thought and comprehensiveness as for their distinctiveness and importance to the subject matters of legal philosophy. This collection is ideal for the professional as well as the student, as it brings together classic essays that are not otherwise available in one volume. The reader sees each author's thoughts and arguments unfold naturally within the context of other important works. For breadth of contributions and intellectual rigor, Readings in Philosophy of Law is unrivalled.

This book by one of America's preeminent legal theorists is concerned with the conflict between the goals of justice and economic efficiency in the allocation of risk, especially risk pertaining to safety. The author approaches his subject from the premise that the market is central to liberal political, moral, and legal theory. In the first part of the book, he rejects traditional "rational choice" liberalism in favor of the view that the market operates as a rational way of fostering stable relationships and institutions within communities of individuals with broadly divergent conceptions of the good. However, markets are needed most where they are most difficult to create and sustain, and one way to understand contract law in liberal legal theory, according to Professor Coleman, is as an institution designed to reduce uncertainty and thereby make markets possible. Another target of this book is the prevalent view that tort law helps rectify market failures when transaction costs are too high to permit contracting. The author argues instead that tort law should be understood as a way of rectifying wrongful losses not inefficient exchanges.

There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms ofdesiresandbeliefs. I intend to perform some action because Ibelievethat it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that Idesire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”

No one denies that moral principles figure in legal argument and practice. However, the kind of role morality can or must play in law has been a topic of debate not only between positivists and their critics, but also within the positivist camp. The topic was brought into contemporary prominence by Ronald Dworkin, who in TheModelofRulesI made the provocative observation that the legality of norms appears to depend sometimes on their substantive (moral) merits, and not just on their pedigree or social source. 1 The observation was intended by Dworkin as a challenge to the positivism of H.L.A. Hart