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15Naturalism in Greek Ethics: Aristotle and AfterProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy. forthcoming.This paper examines the ancient appeal to nature in ethics to support the account of the final end in life offered by the various schools from aristotle onwards. various modern objections against the appeal to nature are examined and found not to hold. as a result certain features of the ancient position emerge: the appeal to human nature is not an attempt to end ethical argument by appeal to undisputed fact; nor does it depend on a metaphysics which we can no longer accept; nor is it meant to m…Read more
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9KAVKA Martin, BRAITERMAN Zachary and NOVAK David (eds.): TheBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6): 1227-1228. 2012.
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1Law and Value in the Stoics: A discussion of Katja Maria Vogt, Law, Reason and the Cosmic CityIn Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume Xxxvi, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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5Platon le sceptiqueRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 95 (2). 1990.The article discusses the sceptical New Academy's interpretation of Plato as a sceptic. The first part discusses Arcesilaus' reintroduction of Socratic method, and the reading of the Socratic dialogues and the Theaetetus implied by this. The second part discusses arguments probably used by the later, more moderate Academy for a reading of Plato's more dogmatic dialogues in a way consistent with scepticism.
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7Jean Elizabeth Hampton 1954-1996Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70 (2). 1996.
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3The structure of virtueIn Michael Raymond DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual virtue: perspectives from ethics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 15--33. 2003.
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8Plato on the triviality of literatureIn J. M. E. Moravcsik & Philip Temko (eds.), Plato on beauty, wisdom, and the arts, Rowman & Littlefield. 1982.
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6Review of Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Human Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (1). 2005.
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Aristotle on Memory and the SelfIn Martha C. Nussbaum & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's de Anima, Oxford University Press Uk. 1992.This essay argues that Aristotle’s view of memory is more like that of the modern psychologist than that of a modern philosopher; he is more interested in accurately delineating different kinds of memory than in discussing philosophical problems of memory. The short treatise On Memory and Recollection is considered a treatise on memory and loosely associated phenomenon and recollection. It is suggested that this work is better regarded as a treatise on two kinds of memory.
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Bouwsma, Oets K. Braithwaite, Richard Brandom, Robert 33 Brouwer, Luitzen EJ 275–277, 279–280, 284In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 345. 2007.
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The Sceptics: Accepting What Is NaturalIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Ancient sceptics, both Pyrrhonian and Academic, cannot appeal to nature as other philosophers do without falling into the commitment to beliefs that they seek to avoid. Nonetheless, they rely on nature in an undogmatic way as support for life and action, when argument on both sides of a case has produced suspension of judgement. Tensions arise when this undogmatic reliance takes the form of a structured theory, as in Sextus Empiricus.
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The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the UniverseIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.The Stoics appeal to human nature in their theory of virtue and ‘preferred indifferents’, showing in a developmental account how grasping virtue is the culmination of a natural progression. They also appeal to the nature of the cosmos to support ethics as a whole, but this does not, as issometimes claimed, provide premises from which specific ethical conclusions are inferred.
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Self‐Concern and the Sources and Limits of Other‐ConcernIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern, thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.
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The Good of OthersIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.
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Uses of NatureIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Ancient appeals to nature are not like modern appeals – from fact to value. They begin from nature as the given aspects of ourselves that theory cannot ignore but also think of the full development of nature as giving us ethical ideals. Natural development thus guides ethical theory without being independent of normativity.
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The Epicureans: Rethinking What Is NaturalIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Epicurus’ appeal to nature to show that our final end is pleasure is less crude than often thought. Instead of formulating a hedonic calculus, he distinguishes between desires in terms of what is natural and what is necessary. He produces a revisionary, ideal account of nature, illustrated by Philodemus’ work on anger.
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Making Sense of My Life as a WholeIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.The entry‐point for ethical reflection in ancient ethics is the question of how I ought to live. This develops into thoughts about my final end and the formal conditions that have to hold of it. The assumption that this is happiness raises issues about similarities and differences between modern notions of happiness and the ancient concept of happiness or eudaimonia.
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The Sceptics: Untroubledness Without BeliefIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Sextus Empiricus represents the only school of ancient scepticism to have developed views on happiness as our final end. He gives arguments to dislodge our commitment to all positive theories of happiness, aiming to produce suspension of judgement, which is alleged to result in tranquility. But what replaces it is not substantial enough to be plausibly articulated as a theory of happiness, and is too dependent on actual agreement to ground scepticism's alleged therapeutic value.
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Nature and NaturalismIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Ancient theories appeal to nature, in several ways, as support. This is distinguished from modern versions of naturalism. The ancient appeal to nature is not tied to a particular theory such as teleology, and involves nature as an ideal.
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The VirtuesIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Virtue in ancient ethics is discussed from several perspectives. Virtues are dispositions with an affective aspect, involving the emotions, and an intellectual aspect, involving the development of practical reasoning and raising the issue of the unity of the virtues. The development of virtue may involve imitation of role models, or following rules and principles. The relation of virtue to right action and to supererogation is explored, as is the book's claim that virtue can be taken as the focu…Read more
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Finding Room for Other‐ConcernIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.
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Aristotle: An Unstable ViewIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Aristotle, in making virtuous activity necessary but not sufficient for happiness, tries to do justice to the intuitive requirement that the content of happiness not be revised so as to shock our intuitions that happiness involves worldly success and enjoyment. But he also tries to do justice to the theoretical pull: happiness must involve virtuous activity over one's life as a whole. Aristotle runs into difficulties over the level of external goods required for the virtuous life to be happy, as…Read more
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Self‐Interest and MoralityIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Ancient ethical theories do not, like many modern ethical theories, recognize a gap in the theory between morality and self‐interest. Rather, self‐interest, developed into an appropriate concern with one's happiness, will already incorporate other‐concern, which in the different theories has different scope.
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Aristotle: Nature and Mere NatureIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Aristotle argues that the virtues develop from nature as matter to nature as form, an ideal. Nature is also, however, what is ‘always or for the most part’. These points are linked to Aristotle's controversial uses of nature in discussing the city‐state, slavery, and moneymaking; on this issue, his arguments are inconsistent.
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Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the IssueIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus sharpened the claim that happiness requires external goods as well as virtue, a claim prominently denied by the Stoics. Their position that virtue is sufficient for happiness requires revision of the content of happiness and adjustment of our attitudes to premature death and many other matters. The strain put on our concept of happiness is, however, greatly alleviated by the Stoic theory of preferred indifferents, which allows things other than virtue to have value…Read more
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Morality, Ancient and ModernIn The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.Ancient and modern ethical theories are compared, with renewed warning against reading modern assumptions into ancient texts. The book's discussions of ancient theories supports the position that ancient concerns about virtue can reasonably be compared with modern concerns with morality, and that the chief difference is the eudaimonistic structure of ancient theories. Some contrasts with modern theories are briefly drawn.
