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Julia Annas

University of Arizona
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Harvard University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
Areas of Specialization
Virtues and Vices
Areas of Interest
Virtues and Vices
History of Western Philosophy
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Misc
  • The Sceptics: Accepting What Is Natural
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient sceptics, both Pyrrhonian and Academic, cannot appeal to nature as other philosophers do without falling into the commitment to beliefs that they seek to avoid. Nonetheless, they rely on nature in an undogmatic way as support for life and action, when argument on both sides of a case has produced suspension of judgement. Tensions arise when this undogmatic reliance takes the form of a structured theory, as in Sextus Empiricus.
  • The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the Universe
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    The Stoics appeal to human nature in their theory of virtue and ‘preferred indifferents’, showing in a developmental account how grasping virtue is the culmination of a natural progression. They also appeal to the nature of the cosmos to support ethics as a whole, but this does not, as issometimes claimed, provide premises from which specific ethical conclusions are inferred.
  • Self‐Concern and the Sources and Limits of Other‐Concern
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern, thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.
  • The Good of Others
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.
  • Uses of Nature
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient appeals to nature are not like modern appeals – from fact to value. They begin from nature as the given aspects of ourselves that theory cannot ignore but also think of the full development of nature as giving us ethical ideals. Natural development thus guides ethical theory without being independent of normativity.
  • The Epicureans: Rethinking What Is Natural
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Epicurus’ appeal to nature to show that our final end is pleasure is less crude than often thought. Instead of formulating a hedonic calculus, he distinguishes between desires in terms of what is natural and what is necessary. He produces a revisionary, ideal account of nature, illustrated by Philodemus’ work on anger.
  • Making Sense of My Life as a Whole
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    The entry‐point for ethical reflection in ancient ethics is the question of how I ought to live. This develops into thoughts about my final end and the formal conditions that have to hold of it. The assumption that this is happiness raises issues about similarities and differences between modern notions of happiness and the ancient concept of happiness or eudaimonia.
  • The Sceptics: Untroubledness Without Belief
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Sextus Empiricus represents the only school of ancient scepticism to have developed views on happiness as our final end. He gives arguments to dislodge our commitment to all positive theories of happiness, aiming to produce suspension of judgement, which is alleged to result in tranquility. But what replaces it is not substantial enough to be plausibly articulated as a theory of happiness, and is too dependent on actual agreement to ground scepticism's alleged therapeutic value.
  • Nature and Naturalism
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient theories appeal to nature, in several ways, as support. This is distinguished from modern versions of naturalism. The ancient appeal to nature is not tied to a particular theory such as teleology, and involves nature as an ideal.
  • The Virtues
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Virtue in ancient ethics is discussed from several perspectives. Virtues are dispositions with an affective aspect, involving the emotions, and an intellectual aspect, involving the development of practical reasoning and raising the issue of the unity of the virtues. The development of virtue may involve imitation of role models, or following rules and principles. The relation of virtue to right action and to supererogation is explored, as is the book's claim that virtue can be taken as the focu…Read more
  • Finding Room for Other‐Concern
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.
  • Aristotle: An Unstable View
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Aristotle, in making virtuous activity necessary but not sufficient for happiness, tries to do justice to the intuitive requirement that the content of happiness not be revised so as to shock our intuitions that happiness involves worldly success and enjoyment. But he also tries to do justice to the theoretical pull: happiness must involve virtuous activity over one's life as a whole. Aristotle runs into difficulties over the level of external goods required for the virtuous life to be happy, as…Read more
  • Self‐Interest and Morality
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient ethical theories do not, like many modern ethical theories, recognize a gap in the theory between morality and self‐interest. Rather, self‐interest, developed into an appropriate concern with one's happiness, will already incorporate other‐concern, which in the different theories has different scope.
  • Aristotle: Nature and Mere Nature
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Aristotle argues that the virtues develop from nature as matter to nature as form, an ideal. Nature is also, however, what is ‘always or for the most part’. These points are linked to Aristotle's controversial uses of nature in discussing the city‐state, slavery, and moneymaking; on this issue, his arguments are inconsistent.
  • Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus sharpened the claim that happiness requires external goods as well as virtue, a claim prominently denied by the Stoics. Their position that virtue is sufficient for happiness requires revision of the content of happiness and adjustment of our attitudes to premature death and many other matters. The strain put on our concept of happiness is, however, greatly alleviated by the Stoic theory of preferred indifferents, which allows things other than virtue to have value…Read more
  • Morality, Ancient and Modern
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient and modern ethical theories are compared, with renewed warning against reading modern assumptions into ancient texts. The book's discussions of ancient theories supports the position that ancient concerns about virtue can reasonably be compared with modern concerns with morality, and that the chief difference is the eudaimonistic structure of ancient theories. Some contrasts with modern theories are briefly drawn.
  • Epicurus: Virtue, Pleasure and Time
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Epicurus, in claiming that happiness is really pleasure, produces an account of pleasure as tranquility tailored to allow it to be our final end. This greatly revises our attitudes to death, particularly premature death, to particular pleasures and pains, and to variation in our activities, which are to produce tranquility.
  • Justice
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Justice is a virtue of both character and institutions. Epicurus treats these separately but, it is argued, consistently. The Stoic theory of natural law arguably depoliticizes institutional questions, treating politics as merely one concern of an individual among others. Aristotle deals with both issues of justice separately; later Aristotelians, influenced by the Stoics, have little to say about institutions.
  • Antiochus: The Intuitive View
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Antiochus’ is a hybrid theory, seeking convergence between Aristotelian and Stoic accounts of nature. He aims to retain the Stoic developmental account of virtue as the culmination of a natural progression, but tries to make the result more intuitive, arguably not successfully.
  • Happiness, Success and What Matters
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient ethical theories all assume that we are seeking our happiness when we try to live a moral life. This produces considerable revision of the intuitive content of happiness, different theories making more or less revisionary transformations of its content.
  • Introduction
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    The book's methodology is set out: we must be critically aware of the theoretical assumptions we bring to the study of ancient ethics, or we risk importing anachronism. The limits of the ancient evidence should also be respected. We must also be aware of the structures of modern ethical theories and prepared to find that ancient theories differ. The ancient traditions and their major sources are listed: Aristotle, Stoics, Sceptics, Cyrenaics, Epicurus and hybrid theories.
  • Aristotelian Responses
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Later hybrid theories in Antiochus and Arius Didymus restate an Aristotelian position on the insufficiency of virtue for happiness, with some attempted compromise with the Stoic view, but these attempts, though interesting, are not successful.
  • Happiness and the Demands of Virtue
    In The morality of happiness, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Ancient ethical theories produce differing accounts of happiness, depending on their position on the nature and importance of virtue. These are important debates, recognizably on the same topic as modern debates about the nature and importance of morality. In the ancient debates Aristotelian and Stoic views can both draw on compelling arguments, and no simple resolution is obvious.
  •  1
    Ethics and morality
    In Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of ethics, Routledge. pp. 1--485. 1992.
    Ethics
  • Index auctorum modernorum
    with Francesca Alesse, Keimpe Algra, Matthias Baltes, Jonathan Barnes, Thomas Benatouil, Mary Blundell, Susanne Bobzien, Mauro Bonazzi, and Paul Boyancé
    In Mauro Bonazzi & Christoph Helmig (eds.), Platonic Stoicism, stoic Platonism: the dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in antiquity, Leuven University Press. pp. 289. 2007.
  •  1
    Epictetus on moral perspectives
    In Theodore Scaltsas & Andrew S. Mason (eds.), The philosophy of Epictetus, Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Epictetus
  •  16
    Aristotle on pleasure and goodness
    In Amélie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, University of California Press. pp. 285--99. 1980.
    History: Pleasure
  •  174
    Aristotle on Memory and the Self
    In Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford University Press. pp. 297--311. 1995 [1992].
    This essay argues that Aristotle’s view of memory is more like that of the modern psychologist than that of a modern philosopher; he is more interested in accurately delineating different kinds of memory than in discussing philosophical problems of memory. The short treatise On Memory and Recollection is considered a treatise on memory and loosely associated phenomenon and recollection. It is suggested that this work is better regarded as a treatise on two kinds of memory.
    Theories of MemoryAristotle: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  3
    Virtue ethics: What kind of naturalism?
    In Stephen Mark Gardiner (ed.), Virtue ethics, old and new, Cornell University Press. pp. 11--29. 2005.
    Moral Character
  •  7
    The Guardians and the Law in Plato’s Republic
    In David Keyt & Christopher Shields (eds.), Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy in Honor of Fred D. Miller, Jr, Springer Verlag. pp. 99-113. 2024.
    I begin with some points from the Republic which are familiar, perhaps over-familiar, to everyone, and then raise an issue about the role of law in Kallipolis which points us to something not so familiar. I hope that this contribution to honoring Fred Miller will lead to the kind of discussion that his own work has stimulated over the years, across an incredibly wide range of topics. I am honored and delighted to contribute to honoring Fred, and hope that this paper will be worthy of its inclusi…Read more
    Plato