•  91
    Presupposing Counterfactuality
    Semantics and Pragmatics. forthcoming.
    There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or ‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conversationally implicating. This paper provides a tho…Read more
  •  85
    A direction effect on taste predicates
    Philosophers' Imprint 20 (27): 1-22. 2020.
    The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism pred…Read more
  •  80
    Taste, traits, and tendencies
    Philosophical Studies 178 (4): 1183-1206. 2020.
    Many experiential properties are naturally understood as dispositions such that e.g. a cake tastes good to you iff you are disposed to get gustatory pleasure when you eat it. Such dispositional analyses, however, face a challenge. It has been widely observed that one cannot properly assert “The cake tastes good to me” unless one has tried it. This acquaintance requirement is puzzling on the dispositional account because it should be possible to be disposed to like the cake even if this dispositi…Read more
  •  65
    Much at stake in knowledge
    Mind and Language 1-21. 2020.
    Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects . But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show that practical factor effects exist. It trades on …Read more
  •  56
    Jesus loves you!
    Philosophical Studies 174 (1). 2017.
    According to orthodox semantics, a given sentence as used at a given situation expresses at most one content. In the last decade, this view has been challenged with several objections. Many of them have been addressed in the literature. But one has gone almost unheeded. It stems from sentences that are used to address several people individually, like ‘Jesus loves you!’ as uttered by a priest at a sermon. Cappelen :23–46, 2008), Egan :251–279, 2009), López de Sa :241–253, 2014), and MacFarlane c…Read more
  •  49
    Sentences containing predicates of personal taste exhibit two striking features: whether they are true seems to lie in the eye of the beholder and whether they are true can be—and often is—subject to disagreement. In the last decade, there has been a lively debate about how to account for these two features. In this paper, I shall argue for two claims: first, I shall show that even the most promising approaches so far offered by proponents of so-called indexical contextualism fail to account for…Read more
  •  43
    Biscuit Conditionals and Prohibited ‘Then’
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2): 84-92. 2017.
    It is generally agreed that there are two kinds of indicative conditionals that do not contain conditional 'then.' There are hypothetical conditionals such as 'If Mary has done the groceries, there is beer in the fridge' and there are biscuit conditionals such as 'If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.' There is also broad consensus that we cannot find an analogous distinction between hypothetical and biscuit conditionals within indicative conditionals that do feature 'then.' Condition…Read more
  •  39
    The cancellability test for conversational implicatures
    Philosophy Compass 13 (12). 2018.
  •  23
    Embedded taste predicates
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6): 718-739. 2019.
    ABSTRACTWide-ranging semantic flexibility is often considered a magic cure for contextualism to account for all kinds of troubling data. In particular, it seems to offer a way to account for our intuitions regarding embedded perspectival sentences. As has been pointed out by Lasersohn [2009. “Relative Truth, Speaker Commitment, and Control of Implicit Arguments.” Synthese 166 : 359â374], however, the semantic flexibility does not present a remedy for all kinds of embeddings. In particular, it se…Read more
  •  10
    Précis zu: Faultless Disagreement
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (2): 274-277. 2020.
  •  9
    Repliken
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (2): 291-295. 2020.
  •  8
    Grenzen der Toleranz: Kommentar zu How to Swim in Sinking Sands
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (3): 467-471. 2021.
  • Faultless Disagreement
    Klostermann. 2019.
    People disagree frequently, about both objective and subjective matters. But while at least one party must be wrong in a disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they? In recent years, a number of philosophers and linguists have argued that we must become relativists abo…Read more