University of Reading
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2008
Birmingham, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
PhilPapers Editorships
Normative Ethics
  •  9
    Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3): 261-289. 2020.
    The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been some speculation about how the consequentializers should react to these theories, but so far there has not been a systematic treatment of the topic. In this article, I show that there are at least five w…Read more
  •  73
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    This essay begins by describing T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism according to which an action is right when it is authorised by the moral principles no one could reasonably reject. This view has argued to have implausible consequences with regards to how different-sized groups, non-human animals, and cognitively limited human beings should be treated. It has also been accused of being theoretically redundant and unable to vindicate the so-called deontic distinctions. I then distinguish between the …Read more
  •  70
    This is a short review of Richard Rowland's book The Normative and the Evaluative - the Buck-Passing Account of Value
  •  288
    Ex Ante and Ex Post Contractualism: A Synthesis
    Journal of Ethics 23 (1): 77-98. 2019.
    According to contractualist theories in ethics, whether an action is wrong is determined by whether it could be justified to others on grounds no one could reasonably reject. Contractualists then think that reasonable rejectability of principles depends on the strength of the personal objections individuals can make to them. There is, however, a deep disagreement between contractualists concerning from which temporal perspective the relevant objections to different principles are to be made. Are…Read more
  •  89
    The advice models of happiness: a response to Feldman
    International Journal of Wellbeing 9 (2): 8-13. 2019.
    In his critical notice entitled ‘An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness?’ focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, Fred Feldman raises an important objection to a suggestion I made about how to best formulate the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. According to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which he or she has constructed for you on …Read more
  •  581
    Consequentialism, Constraints, and Good-Relative-to
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (1): 1-9. 2008.
    Recently, it has been a part of the so-called consequentializing project to attempt to construct versions of consequentialism that can support agent-relative moral constraints. Mark Schroeder has argued that such views are bound to fail because they cannot make sense of the agent relative value on which they need to rely. In this paper, I provide a fitting-attitude account of both agent-relative and agent-neutral values that can together be used to consequentialize agent-relative constraints.
  •  284
    Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3): 261-289. 2020.
    The aim of the consequentializing project is to show that, for every plausible ethical theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it. One challenge this project faces is that there are common-sense ethical theories that posit moral dilemmas. There has been some speculation about how the consequentializers should react to these theories, but so far there has not been a systematic treatment of the topic. In this article, I show that there are at least five w…Read more
  •  64
    In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 1-20. 2019.
    This chapter begins by explaining two widespread attitudes towards the methods of moral philosophy. The first common attitude is that the appropriate method for doing ethics was described by John Rawls when he formulated the reflective equilibrium method. Another common attitude is that moral philosophy has no method – anything goes in ethical theorising as long as the results are significant enough. The chapter then motivates the volume by arguing that these attitudes are not helpful. The refle…Read more
  •  248
    Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14, Oxford University Press. pp. 47-69. 2019.
    According to contextualist theories in metaethics, when you use a moral term in a context, the context plays an ineliminable part in determining what natural property will be the semantic value of the term. Furthermore, on subjectivist and relativist versions of these views, it is either the speaker's own moral code or her moral community's moral code that constitutes the reference-fixing context. One standard objection to views of this type is that they fail to enable us to disagree in ordinary…Read more
  •  27
    Methodology and Moral Philosophy (edited book)
    Routledge. 2019.
    Moral philosophy is one of the core areas of philosophy. It is a fruitful research project in which ethicists investigate a range of different kinds of questions from the abstract metaethical puzzles concerning the meaning of moral language to the concrete ethical problems such as how much we should do to help other people. Yet, even if different answers to all these questions are intensively debated in moral philosophy, there is surprising little explicit reflection of what the appropriate ways…Read more
  •  129
    Review of Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue (review)
    Ratio 19 (2). 2006.
    This paper is a short book review of Nomy Arpaly's brilliant book Unprincipled Virtue.
  •  114
    This is Ethics: An Introduction
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2014.
    What makes you happy? Should you always do what is best for you, or what is best for everyone? What is the meaning of life – and how are we supposed to think about it? Should sacrifices be made to help future generations? This Is Ethics presents an accessible and engaging introduction to a variety of issues relating to contemporary moral philosophy. It reveals the intimate connection between timeless philosophical problems about right and wrong and offers timely and thought-provoking insights on…Read more
  •  126
    What We Owe to Many
    Social Theory and Practice 30 (4): 485-506. 2004.
    This article is an attempt to defend Scanlon's contractualism against the so-called aggregation problems. Scanlon's contractualism attempts to make sense of right and wrong in terms of principles which no one could reasonably reject. These principles are a function of what kind personal objections persons can make to alternative sets of moral principles. Because of this, it has been argued that contractualism is unable to account for how groups of different sizes are to be treated. In this artic…Read more
  •  30
    This is a short review of Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer's book The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics.
  •  698
    The subjectivist consequences of expressivism
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3): 364-387. 2009.
    Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has certain attitudes to be expressed. The truth-conditions of that belief then allegedly provide truth-conditions also for the moral utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. Critics have argued that this argument fails as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussion…Read more
  •  110
    The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons
    Essays in Philosophy 12 (1): 32-54. 2011.
    This article is a critical examination of Harry Frankfurt's view of reasons. Frankfurt has argued in a number of recent books for the view which holds that all practical reasons are a function of what we love. This article examines Frankfurt's key argument for this claim. It uses the analogy of a similar argument in the domain of epistemic reasons to show where Frankfurt's argument fails. It also argues that there are a number of plausible views about practical reasons that are available for us …Read more
  •  82
    Review of Anita M. Superson's The Moral Skeptic (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
    This is a short review of Anita Superson's book The Moral Skeptic.
  •  146
    Reason‐Statements As Non‐Extensional Contexts
    Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248): 592-613. 2012.
    Many believe that, if true, reason-statements of the form ‘that X is F is a reason to φ’ describe a ‘favouring-relation’ between the fact that X is F and the act of φing. This favouring-relation has been assumed to share many features of other, more concrete relations. This combination of views leads to immediate problems. Firstly, unlike statements about many other relations, reason-statements can be true even when the relata do not exist, i.e., when the relevant facts do not obtain and the rel…Read more
  •  151
    Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8, Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194. 2013.
    Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many…Read more
  •  147
    Review of R. Crisp's Reasons and the Good (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228). 2007.
    This paper is a short review of Roger Crisp's book Reasons and the Good.
  •  149
    Naturalism in Metaethics
    In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 351-368. 2016.
    This chapter offers an introduction to naturalist views in contemporary metaethics. Such views attempt to find a place for normative properties (such as goodness and rightness) in the concrete physical world as it is understood by both science and common sense. The chapter begins by introducing simple naturalist conceptual analyses of normative terms. It then explains how these analyses were rejected in the beginning of the 20th Century due to G.E. Moore’s influential Open Question Argument. Af…Read more
  •  52
    The Argument From Intransigence For Non-cognitivism
    Philosophical Writings 35 (2). 2007.
    There is a classic disagreement in moral psychology about the mental states that constitute the sincere acceptance of moral claims. Cognitivists hold that these states are beliefs aiming at a correct description of the world; whereas non-cognitivists argue that they must be some other kind of attitude. Mark Eli Kalderon has recently presented a new argument for non-cognitivism. He argues that all cognitivist inquiries include certain epistemic obligations for the participants in cases of disagre…Read more
  •  166
    Parfit’s mountain (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 54 (54): 102-103. 2011.
    This is a short review of Derek Parfit's On What Matters Volumes 1 and 2.
  •  104
    Review of G. Björnsson et al's (eds.) Motivational Internalism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264): 658-661. 2016.
    This is a short review of collection of articles entitled Motivational Internalism, which was edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund.
  •  114
    This article is a short book review of Erik Wielenberg's book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.
  •  233
    Review of T. M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (review)
    Utilitas 19 (4): 524-526. 2007.
    This paper is a short review of T.M. Scanlon's book What We Owe to Each Other. The book itself is already a philosophical classic. It defends a contractualist ethical theory but also has many interesting things to say about reasons, value, well-being, promises, relativism, and so on.
  •  116
    This is a review of three books by Thomas Hurka. The first one, Drawing Morals - Essays in Ethical Theory, is a collection of Hurka's previously published articles. The second one, The Best Things in Life, is a short book on happiness, pleasure and love intended for the general audience. Finally, the third book, Underivative Duty is a collection of articles edited by Hurka on British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing.
  •  140
    This is a review of Michael Devitt's collection of previously published articles entitled Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. The review also suggests a new way of formulation the realism/anti-realism contrast on the basis of Devitt's work. This contrast is understood in terms explanatory priority: should we in a given domain begin our theorizing from metaphysics (realism) or semantics (anti-realism)?
  •  123
    Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity
    Acta Analytica 32 (2): 193-212. 2017.
    In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that normative judgments are beliefs; that some normative beliefs are true; that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative belief…Read more
  •  108
    Review of John Kekes's The Human Condition (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1). 2011.
    This article is a short review of John Kekes's book The Human Condition.