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Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop.Contrastive ReasonsOxford University Press. 2017.
Charlottesville, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Reasons |
| Practical Reason |
| Moral Language |
| Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
3 more
| Meta-Ethics |
| Value Theory |
| Normative Ethics |
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Moral Language |
| Practical Reason |
| Reasons |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Moral Language |
| Moral Language, Misc |