Contemporary virtue epistemologists who write about education have often failed to answer two rather fundamental questions: firstly, “Why cultivate intellectual virtues?” Secondly, and more fundamentally, “Why ought children to learn? That is, how should we conceive of the epistemic goal of education?” In addressing this latter question, I posit that cognitive flourishing is the comprehensive epistemic goal of education that can serve as the basis for virtue-focused epistemology of education. Af…
Read moreContemporary virtue epistemologists who write about education have often failed to answer two rather fundamental questions: firstly, “Why cultivate intellectual virtues?” Secondly, and more fundamentally, “Why ought children to learn? That is, how should we conceive of the epistemic goal of education?” In addressing this latter question, I posit that cognitive flourishing is the comprehensive epistemic goal of education that can serve as the basis for virtue-focused epistemology of education. After establishing this point, I then argue that a well-grounded virtue-centered epistemology of education would be possible after addressing the following three questions: 1) what is a cognitively good life? 2) how does it relate to understanding? and 3) what is the relationship between understanding and intellectual virtues?