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48Titles and abstracts for the Pitt-London Workshop in the Philosophy of Biology and Neuroscience: September 2001.
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23From social media to search engines to Wikipedia, the internet is thoroughly embedded in how we produce, locate, and share knowledge around the world. Who Should We Be Online? provides an account of online knowledge that takes seriously the role of sexist, racist, transphobic, colonial, and capitalist forms of oppression. Frost-Arnold argues against analyzing internet users as a collection of identical generic people with smartphones. The novel epistemology developed in this book recognizes that…Read more
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82Who Should We Be Online? A Social Epistemology for the InternetOxford University Press. 2023.From social media to search engines to Wikipedia, the internet is thoroughly embedded in how we produce, locate, and share knowledge around the world. Who Should We Be Online? provides an account of online knowledge that takes seriously the role of sexist, racist, transphobic, colonial, and capitalist forms of oppression. Frost-Arnold argues against analyzing internet users as a collection of identical generic people with smartphones. The novel epistemology developed in this book recognizes t…Read more
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110Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic VirtueHypatia 29 (4): 790-807. 2014.This paper argues that trustworthiness is an epistemic virtue that promotes objectivity. I show that untrustworthy imposture can be an arrogant act of privilege that silences marginalized voices. But, as epistemologists of ignorance have shown, sometimes trickery and the betrayal of epistemic norms are important resistance strategies. This raises the question: when is betrayal of trust epistemically virtuous? After establishing that trust is central to objectivity, I argue for the following answ…Read more
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70Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 2: Female Orgasms and Evolutionary Theory.
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254The cognitive attitude of rational trustSynthese 191 (9). 2014.I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to inspire trustworthiness, coping…Read more
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24In recent years several philosophers of biology have proposed a pluralistic approach to science. In The Disorder of Things, John Dupré argues for a version of pluralism. Pluralists of all breeds must deal with a familiar class of worries that are routinely expressed at the suggestion of any move away from monism. One such worry is that pluralism is a relativistic position in which "anything goes" in science. In this paper I examine Dupré's proposals for saving his pluralism from the much-feared …Read more
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62Willful ignorance: Lee McIntyre: Respecting truth: Willful ignorance in the internet age. New York: Routledge, 2015, xi+150pp, $29.95Metascience 25 (2): 323-326. 2016.A book review of Lee McIntyre's Respecting Truth: Willful Ignorance in the Internet Age
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108Moral trust & scientific collaborationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3): 301-310. 2013.Modern scientific knowledge is increasingly collaborative. Much analysis in social epistemology models scientists as self-interested agents motivated by external inducements and sanctions. However, less research exists on the epistemic import of scientists’ moral concern for their colleagues. I argue that scientists’ trust in their colleagues’ moral motivations is a key component of the rationality of collaboration. On the prevailing account, trust is a matter of mere reliance on the self-intere…Read more
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355Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of PrejudiceSocial Epistemology 30 (5-6): 513-531. 2016.Ignorance of one’s privileges and prejudices is an epistemic problem. While the sources of ignorance of privilege and prejudice are increasingly understood, less clarity exists about how to remedy ignorance. In fact, the various causes of ignorance can seem so powerful, various, and mutually reinforcing that studying the epistemology of ignorance can inspire pessimism about combatting socially constructed ignorance. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted. The testimony of members of oppresse…Read more
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5093Trustworthiness and truth: The epistemic pitfalls of internet accountabilityEpisteme 11 (1): 63-81. 2014.Since anonymous agents can spread misinformation with impunity, many people advocate for greater accountability for internet speech. This paper provides a veritistic argument that accountability mechanisms can cause significant epistemic problems for internet encyclopedias and social media communities. I show that accountability mechanisms can undermine both the dissemination of true beliefs and the detection of error. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, I suggest alternative …Read more