Karl G. Bergman

Are proper functions normative? In this paper, I try to answer this question. Acknowledging that the notion of normativity is too ill-defined to afford a categorical yes/no answer, I proceed by attempting to identify arguments for an affirmative answer and trying to articulate what conception of normativity they rely on: what "normativity" has to be, in order for these arguments to work. I identify three arguments for the conclusion that proper functions are *bearer* normative, i.e., normative for the things that have the functions in question. I then propose that two of the arguments may be generalized to the *agentive* case, in defense of the conclusion that proper functions are also, at least in some cases, normative for agents.

Teleosemantics has an indeterminacy problem. In an earlier publication, I argued that teleosemanticists may afford to be realists about indeterminacy, pointing to the phenomenon of vagueness as a case of really‐existing semantic indeterminacy. Here, I continue that project by proposing two criteria of adequacy that a semantically indeterminate theory should meet: a criterion of theoretical adequacy and a criterion of extensional adequacy. I present reasons to think that indeterminate versions of teleosemantics can meet these criteria. I end by discussing vagueness, concluding that it most likely is not the same kind of phenomenon as the semantic indeterminacy afflicting teleosemantics.

The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantics. I further argue that there are positive reasons to endorse indeterminacy realism. I end the paper by arguing that indeterminacy realism need not generalize viciously to the case of propositional attitudes.