Kate Brelje

In the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (Aesthetic Letters), Friedrich Schiller asserts the importance of play for human beings. He claims, “man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays” (Schiller, 2005, 131). Play is so pivotal that it qualifies as the activity resonating the state of human fullness. So, naturally, one might ask, what does play consist in for Schiller? While a Kantian approach might see play as the relation that manifests when a disinterested subject beholds something beautiful, Schiller uses more artistic and embodied examples of play throughout the Aesthetic Letters. In offering an alternative reading to Paul Guyer’s analysis of Schillerian play as serious (forgoing creativity and imagination), intellectual (objective and grounded in the intellect, rather than feeling), and negative (reliant on constraints) I draw out two important elements of Schillerian play: play force (the harmonious relation of two types of drives found in nature) and the forms of play (actual instances of aesthetic play.)

Two foundational ethicists of care, Nel Noddings and Eva Feder Kittay, limit the moral community of care to humans. Noddings claims that the reciprocity required for her care ethic cannot be universally present in human relationships with non-humans. Kittay advances that her care ethic requires the cared-for’s assent, or “taking up” of the care, in response to the carer’s actions, which she claims is impossible with non-human cared-fors. But these claims can be disputed. I offer a few examples to contend that ethically meaningful reciprocity is possible in some human relationships with more-than-human entities and that some non-human cared-fors can assent to carers’ actions. Following from the work of Mary Anne Warren and others on moral personhood, “humans” and “persons” can refer to different things: biological organisms and a designation of moral status respectively. There can be persons that are not humans (e.g., legal persons like corporations and chimpanzees, and moral persons like whales and dolphins). Because the concerns of Noddings and Kittay can be addressed and there are non-human persons, I argue that we should reject the human restriction within care ethics. Humans have morally significant relationships with non-human persons and we need to open the realm of care ethics to legitimize and enhance these other relationships in our rich communities.