Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Department of Philosophy
PhD
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
  •  114
    Letter from the Editors
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (1). 2020.
  •  69
    'The Extended Mind', edited by Richard Menary
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2): 405-407. 2012.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-3, Ahead of Print
  •  45
    Doing Without Concepts Edouard Machery New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 296 pages, ISBN: 0195306880 (hbk); $65.00 This paper offers a critical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts, with a particular emphasis on an approach to concept individuation that is consistent with many of Machery's arguments but has the potential to avoid his eliminativist conclusion. The approach agrees with Machery's claims to the effect that prototypes, exemplars, theories (and so on) form a hetero…Read more
  •  23
    Unity amidst heterogeneity in theories of concepts
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 210-211. 2010.
    This commentary raises two concerns with Machery's approach in Doing without Concepts. The first concern is that it may be possible to preserve a unified theory of concepts by distinguishing facts about concept individuation from facts about cognitive structures and processes. The second concern questions the sharpness of the distinction Machery draws between psychological and philosophical conceptions of concepts
  •  95
    Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind
    Noûs 47 (1): 342-367. 2013.
    This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference-based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke-style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference-based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational …Read more
  •  161
    What concepts do
    Synthese 170 (2). 2009.
    This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders …Read more
  •  19
    Review of David Thompson, Daniel Dennett (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6). 2010.
  •  17
    Referring when push-comes-to-shove
    In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
    The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the motivations for a ref…Read more
  •  145
    Concept referentialism and the role of empty concepts
    Mind and Language 25 (1): 89-118. 2010.
    This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based…Read more