Kiraan Chetty

Whether as a rule, principle, ideal, or procedure, self-determination – however complicated – is here to stay. For it to remain politically viable, however, we need reexamine its ontology and teleology: its existence and function. As we leave the modern age in which it was molded, self-determination is confronted by challenges unique to our time. How we, in the 21st century, manage to keep alive and accommodate the concept will determine how the next stage in our global history unfolds. The aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to explore the theoretical foundations of self-determination, (ii) to examine the practical implications and challenges that follow, and (iii) to chart a course for its future directions in global terms. Taking self-determination seriously – if, indeed, we believe that is still worth doing – requires us to think critically about its use (and abuse) as a key doctrine of international law; no longer can we take for granted what we did, in its establishment. To that end, we begin first with an exploration of self-determination as a concept, descriptively and normatively, in Section 2. Through legal theory and political theory, then the philosophy, and on to the psychology, of self-determination, we construct its theoretical foundations; strong and diverse as we find them to be. We then move on, in Section 3, to examine the practice of self-determination. From its historical origins through to its judicial development, we come to see how self-determination actually happens – finding the modern processes to be elusive, giving rise to a central practical problem: what to do with secession. In Section 4, in moving from theory to practice, we attempt to develop a theoretically-informed praxis. We consider first the relevant theoretical challenges self-determination proposes and consider next what the practical responses to those may be. And finally, in Section 5, policy recommendations are made to that effect.

Ever since its entrenching of a fundamentally political mission with the Harare Declaration in 1991, the relevance of the modern Commonwealth has been fiercely contested. Not only has its organisational purpose been questioned but its efficacy in delivering its democratic goals continues to be undermined as well. This article seeks to relocate the debate to within the spheres of political philosophy and normative international relations theory and argues that a defence of the Commonwealth can be found in John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples. This defence, however, is conditioned on, and accompanied with, a proposal for an open enlargement foreign policy which furthers the Commonwealth’s commitment to global justice.