Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
  • Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
    Associate Professor
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics
Value Theory
  •  147
    Deservingness Transfers
    Utilitas 1-10. forthcoming.
    This paper seeks to cause trouble for a brand of consequentialism known as “desertarianism”. In somewhat different ways, views of this kind evaluate outcomes more favourably, other things equal, the better the fit between the welfare different people enjoy and the welfare they each deserve. These views imply that we can improve outcomes by redistributing welfare to fit desert, which seems plausible enough. Unfortunately, they also imply that we can improve outcomes by redistributing desert to fi…Read more
  •  337
    How To Be a Moral Platonist
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10). 2015.
    Contrary to popular opinion, non-natural realism can explain both why normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and why this pattern is analytic. The explanation proceeds by positing a subtle polysemy in normative predicates like “good”. Such predicates express slightly different senses when they are applied to particulars (like Florence Nightingale) and to kinds (like altruism). The former sense, “goodPAR”, can be defined in terms of the latter, “goodKIN”, as follows: x is goodP…Read more
  •  447
    Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction
    Journal of Philosophy 113 (7): 346-357. 2016.
    The article defends a mild form of pessimism about moral deference, by arguing that deference is incompatible with authentic interaction, that is, acting in a way that communicates our own normative judgment. The point of such interaction is ultimately that it allows us to get to know and engage one another. This vindication of our intuitive resistance to moral deference is upheld, in a certain range of cases, against David Enoch’s recent objection to views that motivate pessimism by appealing t…Read more
  •  758
    Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest
    Philosophical Studies 152 (2): 229-243. 2011.
    This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.