•  153
    The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (review)
    Mind 113 (449): 193-195. 2004.
  •  146
    First-person thought and the use of ‘I’
    Synthese 163 (2): 145-156. 2008.
    The traditional account of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of 'I' conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.
  •  117
  •  113
    Suppressed Belief
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 17-24. 2007.
    Moran conceives of conscious belief as a conscious activity, rather than awareness of a mental state. Once conscious belief is understood in this way, the notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. In this paper, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to sketch an account of suppressed belief. I suggest that suppressed beliefs should not be understood as attitudes towards propositions. Instead, they should be conceived as ways of perceiving and interacting with the world that are out of keepi…Read more
  •  100
    Philosophical Studies 128 (2): 257-283. 2006.
    It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on a…Read more
  •  98
    Philosophy of mind
    Philosophical Books 46 (2): 170-174. 2005.
  •  96
    Time for consciousness: intention and introspection (review)
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3): 369-376. 2011.
    We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intenti…Read more
  •  62
    Hermeneutical Injustice and the Problem of Authority
    Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3): 1-23. 2017.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a wrong she calls ‘hermeneutical injustice’. A culture’s hermeneutical resources are the shared meanings its members use to understand their experience, and communicate this understanding to others. Cultures tend to be composed of different social groups that are organised hierarchically. As a consequence of these uneven power relations, the culture’s shared meanings often reflect the lives of its more powerful members, and fail to properly capture the experiences of t…Read more
  •  56
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty is hailed as one of the key philosophers of the twentieth century. _Phenomenology of Perception_ is his most famous and influential work, and an essential text for anyone seeking to understand phenomenology. In this _GuideBook_ Komarine Romdenh-Romluc introduces and assesses: Merleau-Ponty’s life and the background to his philosophy the key themes and arguments of _Phenomenology of Perception_ the continuing importance of Merleau-Ponty’s work to philosophy. _Merleau-Ponty a…Read more
  •  42
    Hermeneutical Injustice: Blood-sports and the English Defence League
    Social Epistemology 30 (5-6): 592-610. 2016.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a form of injustice she calls “hermeneutical injustice”. She argues that each culture has a stock of shared meanings that its members can use to describe their experience. Cultures are made up of different social groups, with uneven relations of power between them. In some cases, a culture’s shared meanings will reflect the experiences of more powerful groups, and be a poor fit for the experiences of less powerful members, who are subsequently disadvantaged. This is wh…Read more
  •  37
    First-Person Awareness of Intentions and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4): 493-514. 2013.
    Each of us enjoys a special awareness of (some) of her mental states. The adverbial model of first-person awareness claims that to be aware of a mental state is for it to be conscious, where ‘conscious’ describes the kind of state it is, rather than denoting a form of awareness directed at it. Here, I present an argument for construing first-person awareness of intentions adverbially, by showing that this model can meet a serious challenge posed by the simulation hypothesis, which draws on data …Read more
  •  21
    Force of habit
    Forum for European Philosophy Blog. 2016.
    Komarine Romdenh-Romluc discusses the relationship between habits and actions.
  •  16
    Thought in Action
    In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    In a series of recent papers, Hubert Dreyfus offers an elegant elucidation and defence of Merleau-Ponty’s view of agency, bringing it to the attention of theorists working in a number of different fields. However, there is a central problem with Dreyfus’s account: he places too little importance on the role of thought in human action. This paper raises some difficulties for Dreyfus, before offering a suggestion for understanding the role of thought in action within a Merleau-Pontyian framework.
  •  3
    Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty (edited book)
    Routledge. 2016.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein are two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, yet their work is generally regarded as standing in contrast to one another. However, as this outstanding collection demonstrates they both reject a Cartesian picture of the mind and sought to offer an alternative that does justice to the role played by bodily action, language, and our membership within a community that shares a way of life. This is the first collection to compare a…Read more
  • Suppressed Belief
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 22 (1): 17-24. 2009.
    Moran’s revised conception of conscious belief requires us to reconceptualise suppressed belief. The work of Merleau-Ponty offers a way to do this. His account of motor-skills allows us to understand suppressed beliefs as pre-reflective ways of dealing with the world.