Konstantin Morozov

Distributive justice is one of the central questions of contemporary moral and political philosophy. Discussions on this topic are often presented as a confrontation between two groups of thinkers: libertarians and luck egalitarians. The former emphasize the dependence of the existing distribution on the individual choice and personal responsibility of people, and therefore are skeptical about various redistribution programs. The latter, on the contrary, emphasize the influence of morally arbitrary luck on the economic situation of people, and therefore welcome redistributive measures to compensate for this brute luck. Left-libertarian claims to reconcile these two types of moral considerations. The classical left-libertarian point of view seeks to offset the influence of brute luck through an egalitarian distribution of the benefits of owning natural resources that are independent of anyone’s choice and responsibility. However, this position does not sufficiently take into account the influence of other factors of brute luck and, in particular, genetic endowments on the distribution of economic wealth. This article discusses three approaches that allow left-libertarians to take into account the factor of genetic luck in interpersonal distribution. First, it is Hillel Steiner’s proposal to attribute genetic information to natural resources, the benefits of which are subject to egalitarian redistribution. Second, it is the concept of equal opportunity for welfare by Peter Vallentyne, Michael Otsuka and Eric Roark. Third, it is the universal dominance criterion of Philippe Van Parijs and Kasper Ossenblok. The first two approaches face a number of moral and practical difficulties, but the third approach is able to overcome them. Thus, the universal dominance criterion is the most promising way to reconcile left-libertarianism and justice in the distribution of genetic endowments.

Robert Nozick is the most discussed libertarian philosopher of these days. The paper examines the question of whether he supported forced taxation. The normative basis of Nozick’s position, the neo-Lockean theory of natural human rights are analyzed. On the basis of this theory, his argument in favor of the moral justification of the minimal state is reconstructed. While this reconstruction leaves it ambiguous whether such the state should be funded by taxation, six arguments are offered in favor of such tax funding. These arguments are based on the same normative premises as Nozick’s own argument and can therefore be supported by contemporary Nozickians even if Nozick himself rejected taxation. These arguments are shown to help overcome some of the critical objections faced by Nozick’s theory and neo-Lockeanism as a whole. However, accepting these arguments entails accepting not only the tax financing of the minimal state, but also the expansion of the functions of this state to provide citizens with a social minimum in the form of an unconditional basic income or some other form of redistribution.

The study aims to expose vulnerabilities of the subject-object paradigm in modern philosophy. The article concentrates upon ontological limitations of the concept of a subject and changing the status of an object in subject-object relations in the context of changing characteristics of the object existence. Scientific novelty of the work lies in identifying points of ontological stability and limitations of the subject concept, which could be used in its further theoretical development. As a result of the research, the aspects necessary, from the author’s viewpoint, for building a theoretical model of the modern subject, which would be based on ontological symbiosis of subjective and objective characteristics, are determined.

Libertarianism is a theory of justice that places significant moral weight on exclusive property rights. On this basis, many libertarian philosophers, from Robert Nozick to Michael Huemer, criticize any form of income redistribution. Ironically, some libertarians, following Philippe Van Parijs, Matt Zwolinski, and Charles Murray, have supported the introduction of an unconditional basic income. This essay seeks to prove that this support is not just a political compromise. By contrast, libertarian justice advocates have a strong moral basis for supporting income redistribution in the form of unconditional cash payments. This essay explores one such reason, the Lockean proviso. The Lockean proviso is a moral requirement for the appropriation of unowned resources to leave “enough and as good” for others. There are many interpretations of the Lockean proviso, but the most ambitious are the egalitarian proviso and the sufficiency proviso. Each of them, but for different reasons, requires the introduction of a basic income. The egalitarian proviso establishes the equal rights of all people to natural resources, and therefore requires that all benefits from the ownership of natural resources be shared egalitarianly — in the form of unconditional equal payments. The sufficiency proviso establishes some threshold of sufficiency, and then imposes a restriction on exclusive property rights so that they can’t prevent redistribution in order to raise all people to the threshold of sufficiency. However, while both provisos require a basic income, they diverge on three important dimensions in assessing this basic income: applicability, taxable base, and amount of cash payments.

Contemporary debates about sexual ethics are dominated by a consent-oriented approach—consensualism. This position well explains the immorality of such acts as rape, pedophilia, bestiality and necrophilia. However, consensualism faces difficulties when it comes to adultery or HIV transmission. This article analyzes such unacquired moral obligations not to engage in consensual sex. A new natural law approach is proposed to explain and justify these obligations. This position places central importance in the evaluation of sexual acts on whether they are aimed at achieving some common good and whether they harm some other good. As will be shown, the new natural law overcomes the difficulties of consensualism and grounds unacquired obligations in sexual ethics. And if this approach is combined with a pluralistic view of the goods that are realized in sex, then the new natural law does not allow the conservative conclusions about sexual morality inherent in the old natural law theory.

Liberalism and paternalism are often seen as incompatible on the grounds that liberalism recognizes autonomy as the highest value, while paternalism limits autonomy for the sake of more valuable goods such as health and safety. This article offers an argument for the compatibility of liberalism and paternalism. At the heart of the argument is the philosophical distinction between having autonomy and exercising autonomy. The second way of defending autonomy is indeed incompatible with paternalism, but the first justifies paternalism when its purpose is to limit choices that reduce one’s autonomy. A modified version of John Rawls’s veil of ignorance is presented to justify the preference for having autonomy over exercising autonomy. The practical consequences of this form of liberal paternalism are then examined and analyzed using three examples: voluntary sale of oneself into slavery, addiction to opioid drugs, and compliance with road safety measures (seat belt, motorcycle helmet). The argument presented provides a justification for liberal paternalism that does not rely on any controversial or perfectionist conception of the good, and is therefore compatible with the classical interpretation of liberal neutrality. It concludes by considering the compatibility of the proposed argument with other versions of liberal paternalism, including perfectionist, respectful, Kantian, libertarian, and left-libertarian paternalism. The conclusion is that all versions except the left-libertarian one is compatible with the justification described, while Peter Vallentyne’s left-libertarian paternalism suffers from internal inconsistency.