Kristin Sampson

This article asserts the significance of the portrayal of the political art of statesmanship as weaving, and aims to show how this image emphasizes two main aspects of the political art of statesmanship. Firstly, the image implies a three-dimensionality, both through the process of weaving and through the thickness of the protective fabric this produces, that in turn indicates the vital aspect of corporeality in politics. Secondly, weaving as a paradigmatic example of the art of statesmanship presents a way of incorporating different entities and joining diverse threads into a cohesive unity, without reducing them to a form of sameness as mere mathematical counting would. These two aspects are in turn connected to an emphasis on the importance in good statesmanship of recognizing the specificity of the occasion and the variety and difference of the innumerable qualities to be interlaced in weaving the fabric of a good society.

The predominant contemporary concept of time is arguably measurable time, promoted as being in accordance with science. This is commonly understood as the time of physics, as, for instance, E. A. Milne claims in an article from 1950 on the modern conception of time, contrasting this with Plato's description of time as the “moving image of eternity”. The prevalence of an emphasis on measurability within such a conception of time is hard to avoid, although this can be nuanced somewhat. In this article I turn to the ancient Greek notion of kairos in order to find another approach to the question of conceptions of temporality. A main objective is to indicate what this concept signifies in terms of adjusting to circumstances, catching the right moment and paying attention to due measure. I also briefly consider Baltasar Gracián's notions of festina lente and détencion in an attempt to show how this suggests a way in which we may be able to develop the ability to do the right thing at the right moment.

The dialogue Protagoras revolves around the great sophist after whom it is named, and his first exchange of words with Socrates. As it will turn out, this debate marks the beginning of a continual discussion that is to pervade the philosophical life of Socrates. The Protagoras centres on the art of sophistry. In it Socrates and Protagoras meet and engage in discussion, and for a large part their conversation focuses on their inability to agree even on the way in which to speak to each other. Socrates wants to have a dialogue through short questions and answers, whereas Protagoras argues the importance of being able to make longer speeches. Through these disagreements some differences between the rhetoric of sophistry and the dialectic of philosophy emerge. However, the dialogue also shows the difficulties involved in making the distinction between the two. As Marina McCoy points out “the contrast here [in the Protagoras] between Socratic questioning and sophistic rhetoric is not so straightforward.” This becomes apparent both in the discussion between Socrates and the great sophist and within the story about their meeting. Sometimes Protagoras sounds quite Socratic, and sets forth arguments that resemble what have been termed Socratic doctrines. At other times Socrates sounds like a combative, rhetorically deft sophist, discoursing in an argumentative way often associated with the rhetorical art the sophists offered to teach. It may be no accident that Plato in the Protagoras has Socrates recount how he is mistaken for a sophist by the door-man when he arrives at the house of Callias. This article looks at the manner in which the relation between the sophist and the philosopher is reflected also in the dramaturgy of the Protagoras. To this end it will examine some of the transitions that are set in motion from visible to audible movement. It will also attempt to indicate some distinctions that are made within the realm of the audible, and argue that in these distinctions some clues to the difference between sophistry and philosophy may be found. The article claims that these transitions and distinctions are relevant to shedding light upon the difficulties involved in distinguishing easily and clearly between the rhetoric of sophistry and the dialectic of philosophy.

This article emphasizes Diotima as a figurative element within the Symposium in order to highlight the philosophical significance of this figure. My argument is that such an accentuation of the poetical opens up the possibility of bringing forth and emphasizing the philosophical impact that she carries. Furthermore, I attempt to show how accentuating the philosophical significance of Diotima in this way, opens up a specific interpretative path in relation to the dialogue. Contrary to most interpretations of the Symposium, this article spends just a little time, towards the end, looking at the content of what Diotima says. The majority of the article revolves around the figure of Diotima herself.