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Respect and the reality of apparent reasonsPhilosophical Studies 178 (10): 3129-3156. 2021.Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties.…Read more
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Reliabilism without Epistemic ConsequentialismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (3): 525-555. 2018.
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An Epistemic Non-ConsequentialismThe Philosophical Review 129 (1): 1-51. 2020.Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attrac…Read more
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Epistemic Reasons II: BasingPhilosophy Compass 11 (7): 377-389. 2016.The paper is an opinionated tour of the literature on the reasons for which we hold beliefs and other doxastic attitudes, which I call ‘operative epistemic reasons’. After drawing some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of operative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states. I recommend a pluralist non-mentalist view that takes seriously the variety of operative epistemic reasons ascriptions and allows these reasons to b…Read more
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Epistemic Reasons I: NormativityPhilosophy Compass 11 (7): 364-376. 2016.This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that …Read more
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Prime Time (for the Basing Relation)In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, Routledge. 2019.It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors. This is the Composite View. In this paper, we argue against the Composite View on extensional and theoretical grounds. We advocate an alternative that we call the Prime View. On this view, believing for a normative reason is a distinctive achieveme…Read more
Southampton, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Practical Reason |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Immanuel Kant |
Kantian Ethics |
Value Theory |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Equality |
Philosophy of Mind |
Indian Philosophy |
PhilPapers Editorships
Infinitism |
Speckled Hen Problem |