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40Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5). 2006.
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12Event Identity and a Significant PhysicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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35On What We Know We Don't Know. Explanation, Theory, Linguistics, and How Questions Shape ThemPhilosophical Books 35 (1): 38-39. 1994.
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56Time-gap myopiaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 55-57. 1972.I answer objections to my article, "The Time-Gap Argument," made by C. Daniels in his "Seeing Through a Time Gap."
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14The Impossibility of Massive ErrorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.
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112Aristotelian materialismPhilosophia 34 (3): 253-266. 2006.I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a functionalist. His func…Read more
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Skepticism about Epistemic ReasonsIyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 44 (July): 273-292. 1995.
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241PerversityPhilosophical Quarterly 26 (104): 229-242. 1976.I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.
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7The Roots of KnowledgePacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2): 81-95. 1993.I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.
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24Experience And The Objects Of PerceptionUniversity Press Of America. 1967.This work argues for a Direct Realist view of the perception of public objects. It argues against the need for special intermediary sensory objects, or sense impressions, requiring only stages in a physical process beginning with events at the surface of a physical object, the resultant stimulation of one's sense organs, and finally the excitation of the sensory portions of one's brain.
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16Blind Realism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3): 715-719. 1995.I argue that Robert Almeder's "Blind Realism," although instructive, fails to show that recourse to completely justified belief defuses Gettier counterexamples. This is because Almeder's notion of complete justification involves conflating truth with "warranted assertibility," thus making truth relative to what was scientifically fashionable at the time
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18The essential tie between knowing and believing: a causal account of knowledge and epistemic reasonsEdwin Mellen Press. 2011.This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |