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40Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5). 2006.
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12Event Identity and a Significant PhysicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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73Event identity and a significant physicalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 171-180. 1981.
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40Perception and Animal BeliefPhilosophy 55 (212). 1980.I argue that sentences ascribing beliefs to non-human animals have the same logical form as sentences of the "perceives that" variety. Pace D.M. Armstrong, I argue that animal belief sentences can be referentially opaque, just as perception sentences containing a propositional clause are. In both cases, referential opacity requires our assuming that the animal believer and the human perceiver has each identified the object of the belief or perception.
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30Skepticism DisarmedCanadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1). 1983.If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger conclusion of ‘univ…Read more
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60Out-Gunning SkepticismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3). 1987.Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle : If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physi…Read more
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19The Irreducibility of KnowledgeLogique Et Analyse 77 (Sommaire): 167-176. 1977.In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analys…Read more
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54The impossibility of massive errorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.
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90Free will and intentional actionPhilosophia 16 (3-4): 355-364. 1986.I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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42The time-gap argumentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 263-272. 1969.I argue that the time-gap argument poses no objection to Direct Realism. In the case of exploded stars many light years from us, what we see is no longer the star, but its light. I argue that in all cases of seeing we see light, but only when physical objects exist at the time of our seeing do we see them.
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35On What We Know We Don't Know. Explanation, Theory, Linguistics, and How Questions Shape ThemPhilosophical Books 35 (1): 38-39. 1994.
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56Time-gap myopiaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 55-57. 1972.I answer objections to my article, "The Time-Gap Argument," made by C. Daniels in his "Seeing Through a Time Gap."
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112Aristotelian materialismPhilosophia 34 (3): 253-266. 2006.I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a functionalist. His func…Read more
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14The Impossibility of Massive ErrorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.
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Skepticism about Epistemic ReasonsIyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 44 (July): 273-292. 1995.
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |