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3QuineIn W. Newton-Smith (ed.), A companion to the philosophy of science, Blackwell. 2000.Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and revised …Read more
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9Quine and the A PrioriIn Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.John P. Burgess: Quine's continuing struggles with epistemological and ontological problems about mathematics and logic are traced from his first rebellion against logicism, through his flirtation and subsequent disillusionment with nominalism, to his final endorsement of naturalism, with an eye throughout to tensions among different aspects of his overall philosophy.
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Reasons in ethicsIn Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary aspects of philosophy, Oriel Press. pp. 177. 1977.
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53Thomas Nagel - Recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, 2008Theoria 75 (2): 76-78. 2009.
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2495Davidsons's Objections to Quine's EmpiricismIn G. Segal P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson, Csli Publications. 2001.
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18On the Value of Scientific KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1): 53-63. 1987.Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. Th…Read more
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6963Scientific valueInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology
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16Quine, Empiricism, and TruthIn Alex Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 63--79. 2000.
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15Outline for an Argument for Moral RealismGrazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1): 215-225. 1981.Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a good …Read more
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59Explanation and interpretation of actionInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 3-15. 1990.Abstract Contrary to what is usually taken for granted, the traditional positivistic and hermeneutic accounts of explanations of human actions do not really contradict one another. There is no logical or epistemological difference between explanations in this area and explanations in the natural sciences. However, if W. V. Quine and D. Davidson are right, there may be an ontological difference between the explanation of natural events and the interpretation of actions
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319Meaning and moralsIn Raymond E. Olson (ed.), Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia, Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972.
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17Interpersonal Utility ComparisonsGrazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1): 283-312. 1982.Utilitarianism, as well as many other political and moral doctrines, presupposes that the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons can be solved. Otto Neurath gave a comparatively early (1912) and explicit statement of this problem, and he suggested that it cannot be solved. This may still be the dominant view. It is argued that recent attempts to solve the problem (by e.g. Schick, Rescher, Harsanyi, Brandt, Jeffrey, Arrow, and Hare) are unsatisfactory, but that the oldest suggestion - i.e. …Read more
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865Underdetermination of Physical TheoryIn Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge University Press. pp. 91--114. 2006.
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103On the Coherence of Act-UtilitarianismAnalysis 33 (3). 1973.The article is a reply to professor castaneda's criticism of a recursive formulation of act-utilitarianism which i have suggested in an earlier paper (analysis 29.2) and which was intended to satisfy the deontic principle that 'ought' is distributable over conjunctions. i argue that castaneda's arguments against my formulation are inconclusive
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53Gary Kemp Quine versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 191 pp. isbn 978‐0‐19‐969562‐1 (review)Theoria 80 (3): 283-287. 2014.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Normative Ethics |