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25Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order ModelReview of Philosophy and Psychology 1-22. forthcoming.If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based o…Read more
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9Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animalsTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 37 (3): 309-330. 2022.Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different ani…Read more
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11Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animalsTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 37 (3): 309-330. 2022.Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different ani…Read more
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42Modest Propositional Contents in Non-Human AnimalsPhilosophies 7 (5): 93. 2022.Philosophers have understood propositional contents in many different ways, some of them imposing stricter demands on cognition than others. In this paper, I want to characterize a specific sub-type of propositional content that shares many core features with full-blown propositional contents while lacking others. I will call them modest propositional contents, and I will be especially interested in examining which behavioral patterns would justify their attribution to non-human animals. To acco…Read more
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17Perceiving Mental States: Co-presence and ConstitutionProceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57 29-34. 2018.Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving other peo…Read more
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70The content of aliefsSynthese 198 (9): 8503-8520. 2021.In “Against alief”, Mandelbaum :197–211, 2013) argues that if aliefs—a sui generis kind of mental states originally posited by Gendler :634–663, 2008a; Mind Lang 23:552–585, 2008b; Analysis 72:799–811, 2012)—are to play the explanatory role that is usually ascribed to them, their contents must be propositionally structured. However, he contends, if aliefs have propositional contents, it is unclear what distinguishes them from beliefs. I find Mandelbaum’s arguments in favour of the idea that alie…Read more
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8Opacidad referencial y atribución intencional a animales sin lenguajePrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (2): 143-164. 2016.In this paper I examine Davidson’s argument from referential opacity against the attribution of thoughts to non-linguistics animals. I will begin by reconstructing the strongest version of the argument — i.e., the one which is better suited to overcome the different objections that have been raised against it. Once that is done, I will also object this version arguing, in a nutshell, that the fact that non-human animals lack language does not preclude us from acquiring some knowledge of their me…Read more
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41Undetachable Concepts in Non-Human AnimalsPhilosophies 3 (2): 14. 2018.In this paper, I would like to explore the idea that some non-human animals may be incapable of detaching or separating some of their concepts both from other concepts and from the larger thought contents that they are part of. This, in turn, will make it impossible for them to recombine these undetachable concepts with others in every admissible way. I will begin by distinguishing three different ways in which one concept may be undetachable from others, and I will show how each of them leads t…Read more
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154Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal MindsPhilosophia 47 (1): 39-58. 2019.According to Hutto and Satne, 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their explanation of the emergence and constitution of intentional mental contents is circular. After identifying the problem, they also propose a solution: what neo-Pragmatists need to do, to overcome circularity, is to appeal to a primitive content-free variety of intentionality, different from the full-blown intentionality of propositional attitudes. In this pa…Read more
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18El pensamiento animal y su expresión lingüísticaAnálisis Filosófico 36 (2): 261-289. 2016.Nuestros intentos por hallar palabras que capturen de modo preciso los contenidos de los pensamientos de los animales suelen tropezar con dificultades persistentes. En este trabajo evaluaré dos explicaciones de este fenómeno discutidas por Beck : la explicación basada en el carácter poco familiar de los contenidos animales -que él rechaza- y la basada en diferencias de formato -que resulta su favorita-. En primer lugar, objetaré las razones por las cuales Beck descarta la explicación basada en e…Read more
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7Creencias animales: una propuesta disposicionalistaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 39-53. 2010.
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60Conceptos de sustancias y conceptos de propiedades en animales no humanosCritica 45 (133): 27-54. 2013.El presente trabajo tiene dos objetivos centrales. Primero caracterizaré una variante de pragmatismo conceptual según la cual algunos conceptos deben entenderse como habilidades para identificar sustancias e identificar propiedades del entorno, y mostraré que quien cuenta con esas dos habilidades satisface, en grados diversos en cada caso, distintos requisitos centrales para la posesión de conceptos. Posteriormente defenderé la viabilidad de extender este enfoque a los animales no humanos, apela…Read more
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Animal beliefs: a dispositional proposalTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 39-53. 2010.
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65Pushmi-pullyu Representations and Mindreading in ChimpanzeesStudia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1): 208-236. 2016.Lurz and Krachun propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations". Now, Millikan distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' …Read more
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8Atribuciones intencionales a animales sin lenguaje: aspectualidad y opacidad referencialAreté. Revista de Filosofía 25 (1): 27-48. 2013.“Intentional Attributions to Animals without Language: Aspectuality and Referential Opacity”. It is generally accepted that intentional attributions are referentially opaque. But, as it is also stressed in the literature, referential opacity introduces difficulties to those who defend the attribution of intentionalmental states to non-human animals. In this paper: i) I identify one of these difficulties –which I call the problem of nonsense –; ii) I offer an answer to that problem. In order to a…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Propositional Attitudes |
Intentionality |
Concepts |
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Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Propositional Attitudes |