Lawrence Cahoone

ABSTRACT Relativism and discussions of the relativity of human judgment have played an important role in philosophy since the 1950s. Such claims are regarded by many as the enemy of realism, the view that human judgments can be valid with respect to their objects as those objects obtain independent of the judgments. Most relativisms assert the relativity of human judgment to some trait of the judge, hence are anthropic. But there is another kind: objective relativism. It was espoused by some of the American pragmatists of the early to mid-twentieth century. Their hope was that objective relativism was compatible with realism while avoiding dualism and idealism. It claimed things themselves are relative. The view eventually disappeared. This article examines this neglected doctrine, not to determine its truth, but its nature. What kind of theory was it, what could it claim to accomplish, and what could it not? Some of its proponents regarded it as a naturalistic metaphysics, but this is problematic. This topic is suggestive for the formulation of a naturalism that rejects physicalism yet is compatible with science and realism.

ABSTRACT Enlightenment liberalism has come under furious attack from multiple sources in recent years, including cognitive science, the social sciences, identity politics of the left, and populism and nationalism on the right. The notions of individual liberty, free speech, and broad rights protections operating under neutral procedural law has been tied to elitism, patriarchy, white supremacy, and oppressive capitalism. This article points out that recent criticisms from progressives and conservatives are not new. They were mostly formulated several decades ago. Further, they commonly create a straw liberalism, failing to recognize the complexity of the Enlightenment liberal tradition. They ignore the fact that the validity of the institutions and processes of liberalism can, indeed must, be accepted, regardless of criticisms of simplistic versions of liberal theory. For those liberal institutions and processes remain the only known means for controlling the forces of modernity on which we all depend.

The struggle between the parties bent on inflating humanity's self-conception and those bent on deflating it continues. Mind, consciousness, soul, reason, free will, language, culture, tool-use—all have been invoked as the unique character of the human, some deriving from Judeo-Christian religion, others from classical philosophy and modern anthropology. Opponents, sometimes motivated by ethical concerns about the treatment of animals, and buoyed by scientific advances in animal and especially primate studies, have either deconstructed these traits or ascribed them to nonhumans. Seeking to block human exploitation of nonhuman species, they argue that humans are not "exceptional" and possess no "cognitive module" ..

This paper suggests a kind of naturalism that, while based in the natural sciences, can address questions of value and meaning, including the compatibility of religion and naturalism. Certainly any of its details may be wrong, and other theories may be more deeply or more comprehensively true. Nevertheless I think it is likely approximately true, and its direction should be capable of incorporation into successor theories (should any successors be interested). It is built to respond to three problems. First, its approach to general metaphysics avoids a number of criticisms of the genre, problems with conceiving the Whole, views from nowhere, and other methodological issues philosophers worry about. Second, its ..

Post–World War Two philosophy in America has been divided into the mainstream of analytic philosophy and a family of nonanalytic schools of thought, for example, continental philosophy and American pragmatism. The current balance of power among these perspectives reflects an event that occurred forty years ago: the “Pluralist Revolt” at the 1979 APA Eastern Division Meetings. What follows is a progress report on the Revolt’s hopes. The tale has something to do with the recent history of philosophy, Richard Rorty, truth, and with the New York Christmas of 1979. It also has to do with recent politics. For while, as the Pluralists hoped, nonanalytic philosophy is today more prominent, and mainstream analytic philosophy more pluralist, than in the 1970s, political trends of recent decades have differently affected analytic and nonanalytic philosophers. The result may be a new version of what C. P. Snow called “The Two Cultures.”

Is Joseph Margolis a member of the often neglected school of “Columbia naturalism”? Columbia naturalism promoted a distinctive non-reductive nationalism in mid-twentieth-century America. Inspired by pragmatism, and Dewey in particular, its members included Ernest Nagel, John Herman Randall, Joseph Blau, Herbert Schneider, and Justus Buchler. Margolis received his degree from Columbia in 1953. Neither his early work in aesthetics nor his mature attempt to justify pragmatic themes in an uncompromising dialogue with analytic and continental philosophy seems particularly “Columbian.” Neither does his radical endorsement of a kind of relativism. However, Margolis is after all some kind of naturalist. Furthermore, the Columbians shared a forgotten doctrine, called “objective relativism.” If the combination of naturalism and relativism is a Columbian fruit, Margolis may have has fallen closer to the tree than first appears.

ABSTRACT When a philosopher and a dog play Frisbee, do they cognize the same Frisbee? Is Fido subject to the “myth of the given”? The questions are not silly, for as Marjorie Grene quipped, “Epistemology is a branch of ethology.” What follows accepts what is usually called a “correspondence” theory of truth and a “realist” account of human knowledge. Nothing new, but what will be distinctive is that it seeks to exploit an unusual naturalism deriving from the American philosophical tradition. It will particularly address the epistemic relation of sensing to knowing. A currently widespread view among those who object to realism can be traced to Wilfrid Sellars's 1956 critique of the “myth of the given.” Sellars argued that the normative “order of reasons” in which beliefs are adjudicated is discontinuous with the causal order of sensation or perception, so the former cannot be grounded in the latter. My claim will be that Sellars was half wrong, and the wrong half can be addressed by contemporary cognitive science and anthropology. The permission to employ the latter is granted by a special version of naturalism, “ordinal naturalism,” formed from the American philosophical tradition.

Kathleen Wallace’s The Network Self: Relation, Process, and Personal Identity (2019) presents an understanding of personal identity and selfhood. Its central conundrum is how a person or self can be a something that, while being related to and even constituted by many things, including endless experiences and events and social roles, hence subject to continuous change, can nevertheless sustain an identity capable of responsible agency and all the other moral and narrative predicates so crucial to us. In response Wallace creates a Cumulative Network Model of the self, rooted in the relational and social analysis of human individuality characteristic of the American philosophical tradition, that, while processural and complex in the extreme, is nevertheless capable of autonomy and responsibility. Her account provides a novel paradigm for the analysis of human self, but with its very complexity raises questions as to the relation between the referents of “person,” “self,” and “I.”

Human “free will” has been made problematic by several recent arguments against mental causation, the unity of the I or “self,” and the possibility that conscious decision-making could be temporally prior to action. This paper suggests a pathway through this thicket for free will or self-determination. Doing so requires an account of mind as an emergent process in the context of animal psychology and mental causation. Consciousness, a palpable but theoretically more obscure property of some minds, is likely to derive from complex animals’ real-time monitoring of internal state in relation to environment. Following Antonio Damasio, human mind appears to add to nonhuman “core consciousness” an additional narrative “self-consciousness.” The neurological argument against free will, most famously from Benjamin Libet, can be avoided as long as “free will” means, not an impossible event devoid of prior causation, but an occasional causal role played by narrative self-consciousness in behavioral determination. There is no necessary incompatibility between the scientific and evolutionary exploration of mind and consciousness and the uniquely self-determining capabilities of human mentality which are based on the former.

What is the core of the distinctiveness of Homo sapiens? Some of the most famous hypotheses include tool use and tool making, language, free will and moral agency, self-consciousness, mind itself, and reason or rational problem-solving. All these answers are partly true. But recent work in comparative psychology, primatology, and cognitive science have converged on a conception of human distinctiveness that underlies these. Remarkably, it was explored a century ago by George Herbert Mead. The American pragmatists played a special role in the development of non-reductive naturalism. But among them, Mead uniquely endorsed the notion of “emergence” developed by the British Emergentists. This led him to an analysis of the emergence of the human self and mind out of social processes, most famously employing his concept of “significant gesture.” In recent decades both notions have been buttressed by philosophical and scientific work. Emergence has returned in the sciences of nonlinear dynamics and complexity, and has been re-conceptualized by philosophers like Wiliiam Wimsatt. Mead’s social conception of the human mind and self have been repurposed by a host of scientists, as in Michael Tomasello’s conception of “joint intentionality” and Antonio Damasio’s analysis of self-consciousness. These developments show that Mead was remarkably prescient in his core insights.

This work develops a philosophical theory of modernity. It critically re-formulates the dialectical theory of modernity offered by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer and others, by exploring the development of modern philosophy and applying the structure found therein to modern culture in general. This reformulation allows us to preserve positive and socially irreplaceable features of early modernity, e.g., humanist individualism. ;The dialectical theory correctly recognizes that post-Renaissance Western culture and philosophy was founded on principles which have lead to their own negation in the twentieth century. Contrary to the dialectical theory's approach, however, the nexus of modern principles is not pervasively dialectical; modernity's self-negation is due to a particular categorial scheme. ;That which negates itself within modernity is "subjectivism", herein defined in a new way. The development of modern philosophical subjectivism exhibits a definite structure, wherein the "transcendental" notions that were incorporated into early subjectivist systems--demonstrated in chapters on Descartes and Kant--are gradually de-legitimated, allowing the previously inhibited implications of subjectivism to be radically and consistently enacted in late modern philosophy--demonstrated in chapters on Husserl and Heidegger. The notion of "philosophical narcissism" is introduced to describe the theoretical problems and paradoxes characteristic of this late modern subjectivism. ;The structure of this transformation of subjectivism into narcissism is then used to re-formulate the dialectical theory's account of modern culture. This re-formulation attempts to avoid that theory's reduction of cultural phenomena to socio-economic and psychological processes, a reductive tendency characteristic of modern subjectivism in general. I present a "cultural theory" of modernity, which seeks to preserve the integrity of cultural phenomena, and introduces the notion of "anti-culture" to describe the self-negated subjectivist strain in late modern culture. ;It is suggested that contemporary philosophy and culture now exhibit an historical need to re-invigorate the notion of culture as irreducibly valuable in itself, and as essential to our definition of human being. A philosophy based in cultural, rather than subjectivist, categories will be better able to reinterpret and preserve the humanistic principles that are modernity's greatest achievement