Lawrence Nelson

In this chapter, we consider, and reject, the claim that all elderly patients’ desires for suicide are irrational. The same reasons that have led to a growing acceptance for the rationality of suicide in terminal cases should lead us to view other desires for suicide as possibly rational. In both cases, desires for suicide can and do materialize in the absence of mental illness. Furthermore, we claim that desires for suicide can remain rational even in the face of some mental illnesses so long as four criteria are met: individuals must demonstrate rationality, have realistic information and judgments about their life-world, be in a state of mind (e.g., their emotions and will) that is not be severely compromised by mental illness, and make choices that are congruent with their fundamental values and critical interests. We conclude that some rational suicides can be ethically justifiable.

Catholic doctrine’s strict prohibition on abortion can lead clinicians or institutions to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion, although a legal duty to provide abortion would apply to anyone who refused. Conscientious refusals by clinicians to end a pregnancy can constitute murder or reckless homicide under American law if a woman dies as a result of such a refusal. Such refusals are not immunized from criminal liability by the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion or by statutes that confer immunity from criminal homicide prosecution. Core principles of the rule of law require the state to protect the lives of all persons equally and to place the life and health of persons above any the interests of providers have in moral integrity or in respecting the moral status of prenatal humans. In some states criminal liability related to conscientious objection also applies to corporate hospital officials.

The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of parenting and adolescent fearfulness on adolescents’ pro‐social values and pro‐social and antisocial behaviour. A total of 134 adolescents (M age = 16.22, 72 girls, 62 boys) responded to questions regarding their own fearfulness, pro‐social values and pro‐social and antisocial behaviour, as well as their perceptions of maternal attachment and maternal appropriateness. Results revealed few main‐effect findings, most notably a negative relation between attachment and antisocial behaviour. However, findings pointed to several multiplicative relations as a function of parenting, adolescent fearfulness, and child gender, including: (1) maternal appropriateness was more important for boys than for girls, (2) maternal attachment was related to greater importance of pro‐social values and higher pro‐social behaviour for boys low on fear and (3) maternal appropriateness was related to lower antisocial behaviour for boys low on fear. The discussion focuses on the importance of examining the multiplicative relations between parenting and adolescent temperament and the implications of this for both educators and parents.

Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”

Professor Imwinkelried is surely right: the propriety of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses in litigation is problematic, and, I would add, it should remain problematic. Such testimony most certainly does not belong everywhere it will be offered by lawyers and litigants in an effort to advance their interests. Yet in contrast to some commentators, Imwinkelried and I both see a place for bioethicists serving as expert witnesses, although we differ significantly on how to understand and justify this place. In any event, serious questions regarding the proper place for expert bioethicist testimony in the courtroom do exist, not only for law but also bioethics as well.The threshold question regarding the prospect of bioethicists serving as expert witnesses would seemingly have to be: “could a bioethicist qualify as an expert witness under the controlling rules of evidence?” Imwinkelried, however, does not perceive any need to even entertain this question as he claims that “technical evidentiary standards are inapplicable when information is presented to a judge to permit the judge to perform… a legislative or law-making function.”

Discussion of the ethics of forgoing medically provided nutrition and hydration tends to focus on adults rather than infants and children. Many appellate court decisions address the legal propriety of forgoing medically provided nutritional support of adults, but only a few have ruled on pediatric cases that pose the same issue.The cessation of nutritional support is implemented most commonly for patients in a permanent vegetative state ). An estimated 4,000 to 10,000 American children are in the permanent vegetative state, compared to 10,000 to 25,000 adults. Yet the dearth of literature, case reports, and court decisions suggests that physicians and families of pediatric patients stop medically provided nutrition or seek court orders much less frequently.

The report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, addresses the central ethical, political, and policy issue in human embryonic stem cell research: the moral status of extracorporeal human embryos. The Council members were in sharp disagreement on this issue and essentially failed to adequately engage and respectfully acknowledge each others' deepest moral concerns, despite their stated commitment to do so. This essay provides a detailed critique of the two extreme views on the Council (i.e., embryos have full moral status or they have none at all) and then gives theoretical grounding for our judgment about the intermediate moral status of embryos. It also supplies an account of how to address profound moral disagreements in the public arena, especially by way of constructing a middle ground that deliberately pays sincere respect to the views of those with whom it has deep disagreements