Leigh Viner

The Stoics, who advocated the extirpation of the passions, the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, and the equality of sins, embodied their radical doctrines in the figure of the sage, provoking both ancient and modern critics of Stoicism to dismiss this exemplar as an impracticable and unappealing ideal. This paper attempts to add depth and richness to an understanding of the sage by highlighting the sage's more human qualities and by examining how the Stoics’ idealized paradigm derives from, or maps onto, the figure of Socrates, with special attention paid to the iconic philosopher's characteristic irony and erotic playfulness.

Contemporary ethicists, especially virtue ethicists, have begun to critique modern rule-centered approaches to moral philosophy. In doing so, they often turn to the insights of ancient philosophers, who were aware of the limitations of ethical rules and principles. These ancient thinkers utilized various types of moral paradigms, including exemplars, as a way to supplement the articulation of principles. One such exemplar is the Stoic sage, who, embodying the extreme and often paradoxical doctrines of this influential philosophical school, is often viewed as an impoverished and unattainable ideal. In this dissertation I argue for the importance of moral exemplars in general and defend the Stoic sage as a richer and more appealing paradigm than traditional caricatures would admit. ;In the first chapter I present ancient critiques of rules and principles, discuss various ancient moral paradigms, and situate the Stoics within that ancient tradition, against the opinion of scholars like David Sedley and Alasdair Maclntyre who view the Stoics as prototypes for modern principle-based ethical thought. I then explain and defend, in chapter two, the extreme nature of the sage and the Stoics' frequent use of paradoxes in describing their ideal. I analyze, in chapter three, the various figures that the Stoics cite as possible sages, including Herakles, Odysseus, Diogenes the Cynic, and Socrates, noting what these figures have in common and how they differ. I conclude that Socrates, replete with playfulness and irony, is the best model for the sage. In the fourth chapter, I address one of the most perplexing aspects of the Stoic sage, the nature and content of her perfect and unshakable knowledge. Agreeing with G. B. Kerferd that the sage is not omniscient, I argue that the sage's knowledge of principles, and her ability to apply them perfectly, derives from her unique capacity for moral perception. I conclude my defense of the Stoic sage in chapter five by describing the sage's relationships with others through her roles as parent, teacher, lover, and friend