Leo Catana

In this article I argue that Socrates appropriated a traditional discourse characteristic of Athenian law courts and politics keyed to the concept of protection (boētheia). More specifically, I argue that Socrates aimed at protecting the Athenians, though not directly, but indirectly, namely via his life-long endeavour to serve (boēthein) Apollo. I thus read Plato’s Apology as a political text, though not “political” in the sense of Socrates being suspect of overthrowing democracy, as sometimes claimed, but “political” in the sense that Plato’s Socrates latched on to this concept of boēthein in the Apology.

In Plato’s Gorgias 482c4–484c3, Callicles advances a concept of natural justice: the laws of the polis must agree with nature, that is, human nature. Since human nature is characterised by its desire to get a greater share, nature itself makes it legitimate that stronger human beings get a greater share than weaker ones. Socrates objects: Callicles’ theoretical approach to civic life poses a threat to the polis’ community, its citizens, and to the friendship amongst its citizens. However, Socrates accepts Callicles’ premise, that the laws of the polis must agree with nature. Still, he disagrees with Callicles about the nature of human nature and proposes an alternative theory of human nature, eventually leading to his alternative concept of natural justice. The article explains the arguments underpinning these two concepts of natural justice, including the conflicting understandings of human nature.

On croit souvent que le mythe du Gorgias de Platon a pour objet d’expliquer comment la vertu dans cette vie est récompensée dans l’au-delà. L’auteur soutient qu’il s’agit d’une fausse piste. En réalité, le mythe renforce la conception qu’a Socrate de la « protection » [ boētheia ]. Elle structure le mythe et est un concept éthique dans le débat entre Socrate et Calliclès qui a eu lieu plus tôt dans le dialogue. Selon l’auteur, Socrate entend la « protection » comme la disposition volontaire à s’exposer à la correction ou à la punition [ kolasis ] ; et la position de Socrate dans le mythe est cohérente avec sa position antérieure dans le dialogue.

This article argues for two inter-related theses keyed to Plato’s Gorgias. Callicles does not represent a constitutional form, but political participation itself, characterised by ambition, competition among political candidates, and the psychological and ethical mechanisms entailed in the process of gaining political recognition. According to Socrates’s understanding, the political leader’s mirroring and internalisation of dominant character traits, held amongst those individuals transferring power, is decisive to the approval bestowed upon the political leader in question. This reading supplements that of Ober, who has claimed that the would-be political leader’s conformity with the demos’ ideology is decisive. This article argues that Socrates’ point is that a would-be political leader needs to mirror the character traits of those exercising power in specific civic institutions, implying a more pluralistic and context-determined approach. Moreover, this reading connects Socrates’ notion of recognition with that of moral psychology.

Plato’s Gorgias sets out to discuss the nature and aim of rhetoric. The dialogue was held in high esteem among late ancient Platonists and it resurfaced in Renaissance discussions about ethics. Olympiodorus produced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, emphasising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni provided the first complete Latin translation of the Gorgias with preface and annotations. Later in the Renaissance we find direct and indirect commentaries by George of Trebizond and Marsilio Ficino. I argue that Ficino’s translation of, and commentary to, Plato’s Gorgias was a significant, but perhaps also unintended, contribution to the dissemination of ancient sophists in the Italian Renaissance. Ficino’s commentary to the Gorgias defends a legitimate and philosophical use of rhetoric, including the one we find in Plato’s own writings. Furthermore, Ficino treats the character Callicles – together with several other sophists in Plato’s dialogues – as an enemy of the Platonic-Pythagorean ethical ideal, maintaining that the sophists were wrong. Moreover, he treats ancient sophists as a fairly homogeneous group, unlike some of the ancient sources.

This work synthesizes work previously published in leading journals in the field into a coherent narrative that has a distinctive focus on Germany while also being aware of a broader European dimension. It argues that the German Lutheran Christoph August Heumann marginalized the biographical approach to past philosophy and paved the way for the German Lutheran Johann Jacob Brucker’s influential method for the writing of past philosophy, centred on depersonalised and abstract systems of philosophy. The work offers an authoritative and engaging account of how late ancient Platonism, Plotinus in particular, was interpreted in eighteenth-century Germany according to these new precepts. Moreover, it reveals the Lutheran religious assumptions of this new approach to past philosophy, which underpinned the works of Heumann and Brucker, but also influential reviews that rejected the English Plato translator Thomas Taylor and his understanding and evaluation of late ancient Platonism.

Arthur O. Lovejoy made rather grand methodological statements about the nature of history of ideas in his Great Chain of Being (1936). These statements were, it is argued, rhetorical declarations, intended to produce the conviction in the minds of his readers that history of ideas was distinct from history of philosophy and thus deserved institutional independence; they were not adequate descriptions of the method actually practiced. Instead, Lovejoy's historiographical practice can be contextualized within nineteenth-century general histories of philosophy. His studies on Giordano Bruno, dating from 1904 and 1936 respectively, illustrate this historiographical continuity.

The volumes under review are of immense value, because they convey to the modern reader how and why one of the most important Renaissance Platonists, Marsilio Ficino, came to regard the writings of one late ancient Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as central to the history of ancient Platonism. The philosopher nowadays known as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the author of four treatises composed in Greek in the late fifth or the sixth century CE: On the Divine Names, On the Celestial Hierarchy, On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, On Mystical Theology. In addition, ten of his letters have survived. The acquired prefix ‘pseudo’ derives from the circumstance that, from the sixth to the fifteenth century..

Thomas Taylor’s interpretation of Plato’s works in 1804 was condemned as guilty by association immediately after its publication. Taylor’s 1804 and 1809 reviewer thus made a hasty generalisation in which the qualities of Neoplatonism, assumed to be negative, were transferred to Taylor’s own interpretation, which made use of Neoplatonist thinkers. For this reason, Taylor has typically been marginalised as an interpreter of Plato. This article does not deny the association between Taylor and Neoplatonism. Instead, it examines the historical and historiographical reasons for the reviewer’s assumption that Neoplatonic readings of Plato are erroneous by definition. In particular, it argues that the reviewer relied on, and tacitly accepted, ethical and theological premises going back to the historiography of philosophy developed by Jacob Brucker in his Historia critica philosophiae . These premises were an integral part of Brucker’s Lutheran religiosity and thus theologically and ethically biased. If these premises are identified, articulated and discussed critically—which they have not been so far in connection with Taylor’s reception—it becomes less obvious that the reviewer was justified in his assumption that the Neoplatonic reading was erroneous by definition. This, in turn, leaves Taylor’s Plato interpretation in a more respectable position

This article critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the 18th century onwards, namely that Plotinus advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential. It is observed that the concept is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the 15th century, and that it remained absent in interpretations produced between the 15th and 18th centuries. It is also argued that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in Plotinus is historically incorrect—we do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings, and his own statements about method point in other directions. Eduard Zeller is typically regarded as the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. In this article, on the other hand, Zeller is seen as having finalised a tradition initiated in the 18th century. Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to Zeller. Schiavone and Bonetti , for instance, have given little attention to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The present analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the modern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed from the tradition of Platonism

In this essay I examine and discuss the concept “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy; I do so in two moves. First I analyze the historical origin of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thereafter I undertake a discussion of its methodological weaknesses—a discussion that is not only relevant to the writing of history of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also to the writing of history of philosophy in our times, where the concept remains an important methodological tool. My first move is to analyze Jacob Brucker’s employment of the concept in his influential history of philosophy, Historia critica philosophiae, dating from 1742–1744. To Brucker, a “system of philosophy” is characterized by the following four features: it is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines; all doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy can be deduced from one principle; as an autonomous system it comprises all branches of philosophy; the doctrines stated within these various branches of philosophy are internally coherent. Brucker employed the concept on the entire history of philosophy, and he gave it a defining role in regard to two other methodological concepts, namely “eclecticism” and “syncretism,” which he regarded as more or less successful forms of systematic philosophy. My second move is to point out the weakness of the concept of “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy. I argue that the interdisciplinary nature of much premodern philosophy makes Brucker’s methodological concept “system of philosophy” inadequate, and that we may be better off leaving it behind in our future exploration of premodern philosophy

SummaryIn a series of articles from the 1980s and 1990s, Michael Frede analysed the history of histories of philosophy written over the last three hundred years. According to Frede, modern scholars have degenerated into what he calls a ‘doxographical’ mode of writing the history of philosophy. Instead, he argued, these scholars should write what he called ‘philosophical’ history of philosophy, first established in the last decades of the seventeenth century but since abandoned. In the present article it is argued that Frede's reconstruction of the history of histories of philosophy is historically problematic.

It is commonly known that ancient schools of ethics were revived during the Renaissance: The texts pertaining to Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean ethics were edited, translated and discussed in this period. It is less known that the Renaissance also witnessed a revival of Plotinian ethics, by then perceived as a legitimate form of Platonic ethics. Plotinus' ethics had been transmitted through the Middle Ages through Macrobius' Latin treatise In somnium Scipionis I.8, which relied heavily on Plotinus' student, Porphyry, and his report of Plotinus' ethics. In this article it is argued that the Florentine humanist and philosopher Marsilio Ficino carried on this tradition of Platonic, or rather Plotinian, ethics. He was familiar with Plotinus' Enneads, since he had had access to it through Greek manuscripts from around 1462; his Latin translation of the Enneads was published in 1492. The article argues that in his commentary on Plato's Symposium, completed in 1469, Ficino made use of Plotinian ethi..