Lia Levy

This chapter argues for interpreting Spinoza’s views on human beings and human life through an interpretationist perspective. This perspective suggests that some individuals interpret their lives based on an ideal representation of human beings (a model of human nature) and strive to live according to this ideal. The practice of self-interpretation, driven by the desire to emulate this ideal, forms the basis of human action, endowing it with a normative dimension. First, I challenge that ‘human’ denotes an essence or species, arguing instead it denotes a being of reason. Second, I examine Spinoza’s treatment of descriptive statements as normative prescriptions, emphasizing emulation and imagination. The third section reinforces the idea that ‘human being’ refers to a regulative ideal. The final section synthesizes these insights and proposes that the conatus of the mind is a dynamic process of self-interpretation, reorganizing ideas and experiences in accordance with ongoing interactions with one’s environment.