•  197
    Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1): 53-78. 2009.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Expla…Read more
  •  161
    Beyond Existence and Non-Existence
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3): 448-469. 2013.
    When Husserl speaks of the so-called ?transcendental reduction? or ?phenomenological epoch?? many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ?accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing? (Id I ?30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ?the positing of its actual being? (Id I ?88, p. 182). Second, Husserl …Read more
  •  122
    It is a study of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Through a critical discussion including practically all previously published English and German literature on the subject, the aim is to present a thorough and evenhanded account of the relation between the two. The book provides a detailed presentation of their respective projects and methods, and examines several of their key phenomenological analyses, centering on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It offers new p…Read more
  •  111
    Contributors
    with Lena Halldenius, Maeve Cooke, John Erik Fossum, Bruce Haddock, and Julia Stapleton
    European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3): 259-260. 2003.
  •  100
    On moral dilemmas: Winch, Kant and Billy Budd
    Philosophy 78 (2): 205-218. 2003.
    This article queries Winch's view that moral issues are particular, subjective, context-dependent and not open to generalizations. Drawing on examples from film and literature, Winch believes he can prove first, that the universalisability principle is idle and second, that morality is wrongly conceived as a guide to moral conduct. Yet, neither example proves his point. Quite the contrary, they show that we face moral dilemmas only when moral theory fails to provide an answer to moral problems. …Read more
  •  81
    This paper asks whether we should still be haunted by scepticism about other minds. It draws on the writings of Cavell and Husserl to show that there is some truth in the Cartesian premise that has given rise to scepticism about other minds, namely, that our self-awareness is of a fundamentally different type from our awareness of objects and other subjects. While this leads Cavell to argue that there is a truth to scepticism, it proves the opposite to Husserl, viz. that other minds scepticism i…Read more
  •  79
    Is there an ‘end’ to philosophical scepticism?
    Philosophy 80 (3): 395-411. 2005.
    P F Strawson advocates a descriptive metaphysics. Contrary to Kant, he believes that metaphysics should be ‘content to describe the actual structure of thought about the world’, there is no need of postulating a world that lies beyond our grasp. We neither need to refute nor accept scepticism since we can ignore it with good reasons. Yet this paper argues that Strawson fails to provide us with good reasons. He fails to realise that one cannot do metaphysics by construing its claims as being mere…Read more
  •  55
    Leaving metaphysics to itself
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3). 2007.
    In 'Time and Being' Heidegger claims that the task is to 'cease all overcoming and to leave metaphysics to itself'. This paper asks what it actually means to leave metaphysics to itself, and how we are meant to understand the difference between "leaving metaphysics to itself" and "overcoming metaphysics". To understand this distinction, the paper compares Heidegger's later position with those of Husserl and Wittgenstein and with his own earlier position expressed in Being and Time. While we find…Read more
  •  53
    Collective Guilt and Responsibility
    European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3): 307-318. 2003.
    Does our responsibility extend to deeds that have been performed in our name? Is our modern understanding of responsibility in need of revision? Arendt holds that it is not necessary to revise our conception of responsibility since there are two forms of responsibility: a moral and a political one. Margalit, in turn, argues that our conception of responsibility is too narrow. We are not only morally responsible for the deeds we have performed or neglected to perform but also for the deeds carrie…Read more
  •  38
    The Bifurcated Subject
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (3). 2009.
    Michel Henry wishes to salvage Descartes?s first principle ?I think, I am? by claiming that there is no need to appeal to the world or others to make sense of the self. One of his main targets is Edmund Husserl, who claims that thought is necessarily intentional and thus necessarily about something that is other to thought. To show that this is not so, Henry draws on passages from Descartes?s texts which emphasize that we should not equate the cogito with thinking but with sensation and imaginat…Read more
  •  35
    Introduction: The Work of Michel Henry
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (3): 359-360. 2009.
    No abstract
  •  34
    Heidegger and `the concept of time'
    History of the Human Sciences 15 (3): 117-132. 2002.
    This article explores the extent to which Heidegger promises a novel understanding of the concept of time. Heidegger believes that the tradition of philosophy was mistaken in interpreting time as a moveable image of eternity. We are told that this definition of time is intelligible only if we have eternity as a point of departure to understand the meaning of time. Yet, Heidegger believes that we are barred from such a viewpoint. We can only understand the phenomenon of time from our mortal or fi…Read more
  •  34
    Kant’s Not so “Logical” Subject
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21 87-105. 2014.
  •  33
    Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 59 (2): 406-409. 2005.
    However, the book, with its promising title, is in many ways disappointing. You may have expected to find a rare discussion between Habermas and Derrida, but there is no dialogue at all. Instead we are presented with two separate fairly short interviews conducted by Giovanna Borradori in New York just after 9/11. The interview with Habermas comprises twenty pages and the one with Derrida fifty-two pages. The rest of the book is written by the interviewer Borradori herself, who compares and contr…Read more
  •  23
    The World Unclaimed argues that Heidegger's critique of modern epistemology in Being and Time is seriously flawed.
  •  21
    Heidegger's Black Notebooks
    Philosophy 90 (2): 305-316. 2015.
  •  14
    Thinking about Non-Existence
    In Carlo Ierna, Hanne Jaccobs & Filip Mattens (eds.), PHILOSOPHY PHENOMENOLOGY SCIENCES, Springer. pp. 695--721. 2010.
  •  13
    The Presence of Husserl
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 30 (1): 59-75. 1999.
  •  12
    On Perceptual Experience
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31 (3): 264-276. 2000.
  •  11
    Existential Flourishing – an Oxymoron?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (2): 217-227. 2020.
    Volume 28, Issue 2, May 2020, Page 217-227.
  •  9
    The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29 (1): 95-101. 1998.
  •  5
    Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience, by Pierre Keller (review)
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 32 (2): 222-224. 2001.
  •  3
    Jean François Lyotard, Postmodern Fables (review)
    Philosophy in Review 19 (2): 118-119. 1999.
  • Editorial
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31 (3): 226-228. 2000.