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600Cut-off points for the rational believerSynthese 200 (2): 1-19. 2022.I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a version of the Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the Cut-off Point Problem” and contend that this problem, well known by Sorites scholars, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle. Very briefly, I show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will lose”, “ticket n°2 will lose”… “ticket n°1000 will lose” are equivalent to soritical …Read more
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417Vann McGee has presented a putative counterexample to modus ponens. I show that (a slightly modified version of) McGee’s election scenario has the same structure as a famous lottery scenario by Kyburg. More specifically, McGee’s election story can be taken to show that, if the Lockean Thesis holds, rational belief is not closed under classical logic, including classical-logic modus ponens. This conclusion defies the existing accounts of McGee’s puzzle.
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312I argue that we should solve the Lottery Paradox by denying that rational belief is closed under classical logic. To reach this conclusion, I build on my previous result that (a slight variant of) McGee’s election scenario is a lottery scenario (see Lissia 2019). Indeed, this result implies that the sensible ways to deal with McGee’s scenario are the same as the sensible ways to deal with the lottery scenario: we should either reject the Lockean Thesis or Belief Closure. After recalling my argum…Read more
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247On some analogies between the counterexamples to modus ponens (and modus tollens)The Reasoner 14 (6): 35-37. 2020.
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130This paper generalizes the (epistemic) preface paradox beyond the principle of belief aggregation and constructs a similar paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case yields a solution strategy---restricting belief/obligation aggregation rather than giving it up altogether---that can be transferred to the epistemic case. Our proposal amounts to a reasonable compromise between two goals: (i) sticking to bridge principles between evidence and belief, such as the Lockean Thesis,…Read more
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51Knowledge and its challenges: Kevin McCain: Epistemology: 50 puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments. New York: Routledge, 2021, 262 pp, £18.39 PB (review)Metascience 31 (1): 121-123. 2022.Review of Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments by Kevin McCain (Routledge, 2021)
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University of TurinPost-doctoral Fellow
University of Turin
PhD, 2020
Turin, Piedmont, Italy
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Epistemic Paradoxes |
Areas of Interest
Sorites Paradox |
Paradoxes |
Formal Epistemology |
Closure of Knowledge |
Weakness of Will |