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3André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness (review)Philosophy in Review 21 (1): 39-41. 2001.
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4Guest editors’ Introduction. Philosophical lessons from complexity: Sandra Mitchell’s contribution to philosophy of scienceTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 38 (3): 253-259. 2023.This monographic issue contains a long article bringing together the Lullius Lectures delivered by Professor Sandra Mitchell during the Xth Conference of the Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Spain, that took place in Salamanca (16-19 November, 2021). The publication of her Lectures is complemented by six original articles that address and examine different aspects of Sandra Mitchell’s contributions to the philosophy of science. In this introduction to the monograph, th…Read more
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1Disposiciones TraicionerasPraxis Filosófica 35 239-255. 2013.David LewisFinkish Dispositions (1999)
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107Facts of identityInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2022.In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity…Read more
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294Transference, or identity theories of causation?Theoria 19 (1): 31-47. 2004.Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) ide…Read more
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228Transference, or identity theories of causation?Theoria 19 (1): 31-47. 2010.I argue that transference is, ultimately, identity over time, and that identity over time can't possibly be causation. Transference, then, fails as an analysis of causation.
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67Singular Causation without DispositionsTheoria 26 (1): 35-50. 2011.Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.
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62A posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean ArgumentDialectica 57 (1): 41-55. 2003.The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to a…Read more
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Los tropos son naturalezas individualesRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 33 (1): 97-116. 2008.En este artículo pretendo la clarificación conceptual de la idea de propiedad individual. En concreto, defiendo que las propiedades individuales no son compuestos, aunque son naturalezas individuales complejas. Por un lado, no poseen un parte "individuante" que dé cuenta de sus condiciones de individualización: las propiedades individuales tienen su propia identidad numérica primitiva. Por otro lado, no poseen un parte "común," "universalizante" que dé cuenta de su naturaleza: las propiedades in…Read more
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¿metafísica Analítica?Límite 14 87-107. 2006.Quiero mostrar en este artículo que no hay una metafísica analítica, lo que no significa que no se haga metafísica desde un punto de vista analítico, i.e., desde el análisis conceptual. Para ello, intento ofrecer un muestrario, inevitablemente escaso, de ideas y posiciones metafísicas diferentes que discuten los llamados filósofos analíticos. Mi tesis es que el interés por la ciencia, la lógica y el lenguaje, siempre desde el intento de racionalidad y objetividad en el método de conocimiento, es…Read more
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1La crítica de Pedro Abelardo a otros nominalismosRevista Española de Filosofía Medieval 12 179-190. 2005.Al escribir este articulo intento recuperar, para la discusión más contemporánea sobre los universales, al menos una parte de las ideas del lógico y filósofo medieval Pedro Abelardo. En particular, hay ciertas formas de nominalismo, léase, el mentalismo, el nominalismo de conjuntos, y el nominalismo de semejanza(s), que han reaparecido con fuerza nueva en metafísica analítica contemporánea. Abelardo, como nominalista que fue, no sólo argumentó contra tesis de corte realista;, sino que también ev…Read more
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7Acciones causales temporalmente invertidasDiálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 37 (80): 51-74. 2002.
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15La reducción de la causalidad a contrafácticos al estilo LewisDiálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (74): 7-34. 1999.
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417The Role of Intuition in MetaphysicsTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 79-99. 2015.In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.
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39Sullivan on the Principle that Everything Has a CauseDialogue 41 (3): 427-. 2002.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas non plus de bonnes rais…Read more
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252Identidad Personal Y ResponsabilidadEpisteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (2): 1-24. 2011.Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más qu…Read more
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624Tropes for CausationMetaphysica 10 (2): 157-174. 2009.Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata
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300On Necessary but External RelationsReview of Contemporary Philosophy 12 93-101. 2013.I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into…Read more
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321Necessity in singular causationPhilosophia 29 (1-4): 149-172. 2002.I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is founded on the nature…Read more
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1441The Discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus: a Follow-up to Kripke on the Necessity of IdentityAnalysis and Metaphysics 16 52-69. 2017.It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and critics, reveal; and I want to show th…Read more
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125On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological EchoMetaphilosophy 43 (1-2): 147-164. 2012.This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories…Read more
Granada, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |