M R. X. Dentith

Some philosophers claim that, in ordinary language, when non-philosophers refer to ‘conspiracy theories’ such people take it that conspiracy theories are—in some sense—_mad, bad, or dangerous_. These philosophers then argue that academics interested in studying conspiracy theories should keep their operating definition close to that notion. I will challenge this by first arguing that whatever the ordinary language conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ might be, the notion that these philosophers are pointing to is _at best_ contrary and _at worst_ contradictory with their own work. Secondly—using the psychological literature as an example—I will show that academic non-philosophers do not seem interested in the folk or ordinary language notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ anyway. Thus the argument for what we might call ‘ordinary language generalism’—the position that generally it is recognised by users of ordinary language that there is something inherently _mad, bad, or dangerous_ about conspiracy theories—fails. However, we can capture some of the intuitions behind ordinary language generalism by focussing on the kinds or sub-types of conspiracy theories that interest us.

ABSTRACT Central to the particularist project, one that has become the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, is the claim that a general dismissal of these things called `conspiracy theories' is unsustainable. That is, if we want to say a conspiracy theory is suspicious such that we should not believe it, then we have to engage in at least some investigation of it. Particularists have detailed just why a general attitude of skepticism towards conspiracy theories is implausible; they have, in effect, created the case against generalism. The case for particularism, then, has largely been about challenging and rebutting generalist arguments. But what of the bigger picture? If particularists argue that we should not assume conspiracy theories are mad, bad, or dangerous but, rather, investigate them, then how should we go about that investigation? In this paper I describe (some) of the preliminary concerns the particularist (and the generalist) needs to account for when developing an ethics of investigation into these things called `conspiracy theories.' Whilst this paper does not provide a framework for the investigation of conspiracy theories, it provides the framework for such a framework.

Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon in academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories looks at whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. It is a qualified defence of belief in conspiracy theories: belief in conspiracy theories can be rational in some circumstances. It covers such issues as: who might be considered a qualified conspiracy theorist; how do we analyse claims of disinformation; is our reliance on official theories a good reason to be suspicious of rival conspiracy theories; and what should we do when official theories and conspiracy theories are in conflict? Matthew Dentith is a New Zealand-based philosopher whose research includes analyses of why we have grounds to be suspicious of official theories, the reliability of the transmission of rumours, and the role of trust in the acceptance of theories.