Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 2011
Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Interest
  •  105
    ‘Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 711-737. 2017.
  •  72
    Semantic deflationism deflated
    Synthese 196 (6): 2435-2454. 2019.
    Deflationism is the view that certain metaphysical debates are defective, leaving it open whether the defect is best explained in semantic, conceptual, or epistemic terms. Local semantic deflationism is the thesis that familiar metaphysical debates, which appear to be about the existence and identity of material objects, are merely verbal. It’s a form of local deflationism because it restricts itself to one particular area of metaphysics. It’s a form of semantic deflationism because the defect i…Read more
  •  53
    Fixing Reference By Imogen Dickie
    Analysis 77 (3): 659-662. 2017.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comI can’t do any better than the author herself: ‘This book is about how we manage to represent ordinary objects in thought and speech’. Ordinary objects ‘are all the things you would name if you were giving a non-philosophical and non-facetious answer to the question of which things there are in a room’. This characterization is f…Read more
  •  204
    An Antinomy about Anaphora
    Linguistic Inquiry 42 (3): 509-517. 2011.
  •  131
    Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency
    with Ephraim Glick
    Mind 119 (476): 1067-1086. 2010.
    We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory
  •  474
    The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 387-406. 2014.
    I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considerations, when combined with a proper understanding o…Read more
  •  67
    Flaws of Formal Relationism
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4): 367-376. 2013.
    Formal relationism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that folk psychological states should be individuated, at least partially, in terms of the purely formal inference-licensing relations between underlying mental representations. It's supposed to provide a Russellian alternative to a Fregean theory of propositional attitudes. I argue that there's an inconsistency between the motivation for formal relationism and the use to which it's put in defense of Russellian propositions. Furthermore,…Read more
  •  100
    Metalinguistic negation and metaphysical affirmation
    Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 497-517. 2014.
    In a series of articles, Fine (Monist 83:357–361, 2000; Mind 112:195–234, 2003; Mind 115:1059–1082, 2006) presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz’s Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine’s objections on behalf of the monist. Following Schnieder (Philosophical Quarterly 56:…Read more