Manuel Bremer

Notes on Vagueness. A 3-valued approach to vagueness is defended. In contrast to other 3-valued approaches the logic is an extension of classical logic, due to the use of both a Boolean negation and a predicate negation. The view is justified by semantic considerations. Crucial issues (Sorites reasoning, higher order vagueness, existence of cut off points, 'penumbral truth') are discussed from the perspective developed, and some contrasts (mostly to supervaluationism) outlined. An extended version appeared as book in 2026 (Berlin: Logos).

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. An extended version appeared as book in 2025 (Berlin: Logos)

Was ist Philosophische Semantik? Bedarf es neben der Linguistik uberhaupt noch einer "philosophischen" Semantik? Welche Rolle spielt diese Semantik fur die Philosophie im Allgemeinen? Welche methodische Rolle spielt die Klarung von "Bedeutung" fur die Sprachanalytische Philosophie? Tritt die philosophische Semantik an die Stelle der Erkenntnistheorie? In welchem Verhaltnis steht sie zur Ontologie und zur Philosophie des Geistes? Diesen Fragen geht das vorliegende Buch nach. In einem zentralen Verstandnis von Philosophischer Semantik ist das Wesentliche die Beziehung zwischen Bedeutungstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie (vermittels der Rechtfertigung von Satzverwendungen). Eine so verstandene Semantik hat z.T. einen eigenen Ansatz, der einen zentralen Stellenwert fur eine Philosophie in der Analytischen Tradition besitzt. Man kann diese Philosophische Semantik als eine "Erste Philosophie" ansehen."

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.

In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a test case of the interdisciplinary research programme in cognitive science. From the philosopher`s perspective the most pressing problem is how to talk about animal minds. Can we just employ the vocabulary of human psychology? If not, exploring animal minds contains the non-trivial task of introducing a terminology that allows to see the distinctness of animal minds and to see its connection to the human case. The treatment of some topic in cognitive science has to reach a reflective equilibrium between our intuitions, a phenomenological approach, philosophical conceptual analysis, various empirical approaches and model building. Reflective equilibrium means in this context that we have to reach a coherent model which incorporates as much of our intuitions concerning animal consciousness and integrates at the same time the findings of the different co-operating sciences. There can be various trade-offs in case of conflict between, say, philosophical definitions of mental terms as to be applied to animals, neurophysiology, our reflected intuitions and ethological model building based on a computational theory of animal minds. The paper gives an example of reflective equilibrium in discussing the case for awareness in vertebrates. It considers the role of evolutionary reasoning. The main focus lays on two examples of comparing our human notions with corresponding abilities in animals, and how an appropriate conceptual apparatus dealing with the abilities of animals could be introduced.

This essay characterizes a version of internal realism. In §1 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of a strong kind. In §2 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The ‘internal’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the justification aspect of truth. The ‘realism’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §3.

Kant spricht bezüglich der Widerlegung des Idealismus von einem „Beweis”. Das ist sicher der höchste Status, den er bereit ist, einem Argument zuzuschreiben. Diese Notiz hier soll zeigen, daß Kant diesen Anspruch zu Recht erhebt. Dazu reicht eine an der sprachlichen Oberflächenstruktur orientierte Formalisierung. Nun hat Kant natürlich die moderne Prädikatenlogik nicht gekannt, aber für den Gebrauch dieser Logik und ein dem gemäßes Räsonieren bedarf es bekanntlich ja auch nicht der ausdrücklichen Kenntnis eines entsprechenden Kalküls. Es reicht aus, daß es mindestens eine Formalisierung gibt, in die sich Kants Argument bringen läßt, um zu zeigen, daß es formal schlüssig ist.

This essay deals with the concept of truth in the context of a version of internal realism. In §1 I define some variants of realism using a set of realistic axioms. In §2 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of some kind. In §3 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The "internal" of "internal realism" points to the justification aspect of truth. The "realism" of "internal realism" points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §4.