•  11
    Transformative Moral Luck
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1): 162-180. 2019.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  30
    In this paper, I argue for two main hypotheses. First, that self-control is not a natural mental kind and, second, that there is no dedicated mechanism of self-control. By the first claim, I simply mean that those behaviors we label as “self-controlled” are a somewhat arbitrarily selected hodgepodge that do not have anything in common that distinguishes them from other behaviors. In other words, self-control is a gerrymandered property that does not correspond to a natural mental or psychologica…Read more
  •  41
    What you Don't Know Can Hurt You: Situationism, Conscious Awareness, Control
    Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (1): 45-71. 2016.
    The thesis of situationism says that situational factors can exert a signi cant in uence on how we act, o en without us being consciously aware that we are so in uenced. In this paper, I examine how situational factors, or, more speci cally, our lack of conscious awareness of their in uence on our behavior, a ect di erent measures of control. I further examine how our control is a ected by the fact that situational factors also seem to prevent us from becoming consciously aware of our reasons fo…Read more
  •  35
    Are intentions in tension with timing experiments?
    Philosophical Studies 173 (3): 573-587. 2016.
    Libet’s timing experiments have resulted in some strong and unsavoury claims about human agency. These range from the idea that conscious intentions are epiphenomenal to the idea that we all lack free will. In this paper, I propose a new type of response to the various sceptical conclusions about our agency occasioned by both Libet’s work and other experiments in this testing paradigm. Indeed, my argument extends to such conclusions drawn from fMRI-based prediction experiments. In what follows, …Read more
  •  5
    Review of "Decomposing the Will" (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 0-0. 2013.
  •  96
    Get lucky: situationism and circumstantial moral luck
    with Stephen Kearns
    Philosophical Explorations 18 (3): 362-377. 2015.
    Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our a…Read more
  •  37
    Simply Irresistible: Addiction, Responsibility, and Irresistible Desires
    Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1): 196-216. 2015.
    In this paper I set out to investigate the claim that addicts lack su cient control over their drug-taking and are thus not morally responsible for it. More speci cally, I evaluate what I call the Simply Irresistible Argument, which proceeds from the claim that addictive desires are irresistible to the conclusion that addicts are not responsible for acting on such desires. I rst propose that we have to disambiguate the notion of an irresistible desire according to temporal criteria, and revise …Read more
  •  37
    This is a Tricky Situation: Situationism and Reasons-Responsiveness
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (2): 151-183. 2017.
    Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it. In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our mod…Read more
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