Marcelino Botin

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we believe that there is a hard problem of consciousness. A solution to the former promises to take us one step closer to solving the latter. While many hope for a physicalist realist solution to the meta-problem, I argue that the two prominent physicalist realist positions in the literature, orthodox Russellian and type-B physicalism, cannot deliver a solution. I then introduce a posteriori Russellian physicalism, a Russellian version of the phenomenal concept strategy, and show that it can overcome the difficulties of traditional Russellian and type-B physicalism. If successful, the paper shows that physicalists need not turn to illusionism because the prospects for a physicalist realist answer to the meta-problem are bright.

Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard Type-B physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable.

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem promises to help us solve the hard problem. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy promises to solve both problems at once while allowing for a metaphysics of mind that avoids dualism, which is hard to defend, and illusionism which is hard to accept. I argue that the strategy fails to fulfil this promise. Standard accounts of the PCS cannot provide an adequate response to the meta-problem because the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts is not the basis of our problem intuitions.