Marcin Byczyński

The aim of this book is to analyse the notion of recognition and to reconstruct the different conceptualisations of this notion by Axel Honneth. In the course of my reflections, I identify the intrinsic ambiguities of Honneth's theory of recognition and indicate the most important points in the evolution of Honneth's thought. As an analytical background, I use the concepts of individualisation and universalisation developed by Mark Jan Siemek, which are applied, to systematise Honneth's theory and resolve its initial ambiguities. In the book I distinguish four basic contexts for the use of the concept of recognition. These contexts relate to the four levels of social structure within which Honneth reflects (subjective level, intersubjective relationship level, institutional level and value level). The research carried out indicates that there is a feedback loop between these levels. In the following chapters, I move from introducing the reader to the subject of recognition theory (formulating the main theoretical assumptions and introducing the research tools used) to a systematic presentation of the feedback occurring between the distinguished levels of social structure The analyses carried out make it possible, in the end, to provide a synthetic characterisation of the different levels of social structure within which the concept of recognition is applied in Axeal Honneth's philosophy. By confronting the hitherto scattered theses concerning the concept of recognition with each other, which allows a more precise separation of these.

The main objective of this article is to introduce Axel Honneth’s method of normative reconstruction. The stages of its development will be shown—beginning from the intuitive reconstructions of empirically available social normativity up to the perspective of social criticism. Starting with Honneth’s self-criticism towards his own early methodological assumptions, I will indicate relevant factors that influenced the change in his methodological approach. Finally, I shall explain why the criticism formulated against the current stage of Honneth’s theory is mainly inadequate.

The aim of this article is to clarify the meaning of the concept of recognition in Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. The main object of interest will be the differences between, what Honneth calls the basic form of recognition and recognition which he describes as a relation. Presented considerations will become premises for such an interpretation of theory of recognition, which differentiates at least between two meanings of the term recognition: first, as a subjective attitude, second, as a relation (which is more adequate interpretation). The indicated differences might be important for in-depth analyses of the theory of recognition, especially considering Honneth’s point of view – more formal approach presented in The Struggle for Recognition, to his analyses of democratic ethical life in his latest book Das Recht Der Freicheit.

Discussing the matter of dueling of honour a question always arises, is the duel of honour just another form of ritualized murder, an instrument to kill a person with full acceptance of the society, or is there something more about the duel of honour. Analyzing available historical sources and comparing different regulations from Polish codices of honour, the duel of honour will be scrutinized in search of its aim, of its grist, of its role in the honourable conduct. The competences demanded from a gentleman by the honour codices will be reconstructed answering the question – is the duel of honour a demonstration of certain competences or just barretry?