•  6
    Correction to: Philosophy in the age of science
    Metascience 28 (1): 55-55. 2019.
    In “Philosophy in the age of science,” a review of J. Beale’s and I. J. Kidd’s edited volume, _Wittgenstein and scientism_, by Mariam Thalos, Chon Tejedor was mistakenly referred to as he, rather than she.
  • Measurement and Macroscopic Quantities
    Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago. 1993.
    The apparent ineffectuality of quantum physics to reconcile its evolution rule with measurement phenomena has polarized the community of scholars working on the subject into, roughly, two sorts of camps. On the one side there are those who perceive the problem to be that of finding an interpretation of the conceptual structures of quantum theory whereon the two elements can be reconciled without having to revise the canonical understanding of either. On the other side are those who see measureme…Read more
  •  20
    Why we believe
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2): 317-339. 1999.
    The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I s…Read more
  •  19
    Why is there Philosophy of Mathematics at all?
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269): 857-860. 2017.
    © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com...Ian Hacking is a gripping writer with an ear for wickedly good turns of phrase. The joyous playfulness of his language can arouse interest in any topic whatsoever. He is also a skilled philosophical conversationalist, who can put long-dead philosophers into dialogue with those…Read more
  •  10
    Who will advise us?
    SATS 16 (1): 67-95. 2015.
    Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print
  •  20
    The trouble with superselection accounts of measurement
    Philosophy of Science 65 (3): 518-544. 1998.
    A supcrsclcction rule advanced in thc course of a quantum-mechanical treatment of some phenomenon is an assertion tc thc effect that thc superposition principle of quam tum mechanics is to bc restricted in thc application at hand. Supcrsclcction accounts of measurement all have in common a decision to represent thc indicator states of detectors by eigcnspaccs of supcrsclcction operators named in a supcrsclcction rule, on the grounds that thc states in question arc states of a s0—calicd classical…Read more
  •  42
    Units of decision
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3): 338. 1999.
    I shall introduce the units 0f decision problem in thc theory of decision, which as I shall explain is 21 sibling t0 thc units 0f selection problem in cvolutionary thcory. And I shall present an argument to thc cffcct that, contrary to Bayesian wisdom on the subject, undertaking decision in group settings (in multi-individual units) violates no precepts of rationality.
  •  24
    A venerable tradition in the metaphysics of science commends ontological reduction: the practice of analysis of theoretical entities into further and further proper parts, with the understanding that the original entity is nothing but the sum of these. This tradition implicitly subscribes to the principle that all the real action of the universe (also referred to as its "causation") happens at the smallest scales-at the scale of microphysics. A vast majority of metaphysicians and philosophers of…Read more
  •  10
    The Economy of Belief or, Explaining Cooperation among the Prudent
    American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4). 1998.
  •  17
  •  12
    Truth deserves to be believed
    Philosophy 88 (2): 179-196. 2013.
    Science seems generally to aim at truth. And governmental support of science is often premised on the instrumental value of truth in service of advancing our practical objectives, both as individuals and as communities, large and small. While there is some political expediency to this view, it is not correct. The value of truth is nowise that it helps us achieve our aims. In fact, just the contrary: truth deserves to be believed only on the condition that its claim upon us is orthogonal to any u…Read more
  •  43
    Towards a Theory of Freedom
    Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 60 (134): 1-25. 2013.
  •  37
    The difficulties of justifying a recipe for scientific inquiry that calls for sensory experience and logic as sole ingredients can hardly be overestimated. Resolving the riddles of induction, steadily mounting against empiricism since Hume, has come to seem like an exercise in making bricks without straw. To be forgiven the debt of solving these riddles, whether by feminists or others, would come as a great relief. But such relief, I shall argue, can come only at the very high price of removing …Read more
  •  65
    Nonreductive Physics
    Synthese 149 (1): 133-178. 2006.
    This paper documents a wide range of nonreductive scientific treatments of phenomena in the domain of physics. These treatments strongly resist characterization as explanations of macrobehavior exclusively in terms of behavior of microconstituents. For they are treatments in which macroquantities are cast in the role of genuine and irreducible degrees of freedom. One is driven into reductionism when one is not cultivated to possess an array of distinctions rich enough to let things be what they …Read more
  •  14
    The Grammar of Experience
    Philosophy 89 (2): 223-250. 2014.
  •  26
    Knowledge in an Age of Individual Economy
    Journal of Philosophical Research 24 169-191. 1999.
    This essay identifies foundational questions, all metaphysical in character, which must be answered before the enterprise of epistemology proper can begin to prosper, and in the process draws attention to fundamental conflicts between the demands of epistemology and the demands of prudence. It concludes that knowledge is not, as such, a directive of prudence, and thus that the enterprise of knowledge does not fall under the category of what is practically required
  •  4
    The Lens of Chemistry
    Science & Education 22 (7): 1707-1721. 2013.
  •  33
    Two conceptions of collectivity
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (1): 83-104. 2008.
    This paper distinguishes two conceptions of collectivity, each of which tracks the targets of classification according to their aetiology. Collectivities falling under the first conception are founded on (more-or-less) explicit negotiations amongst the members who are known to one another personally. Collectivities falling under the second (philosophically neglected) conception are founded - at least initially - purely upon a shared conception of "we", very often in the absence of prior acquaint…Read more
  •  453
    Two Conceptions of Fundamentality
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2): 151-177. 2011.
    This article aims to show that fundamentality is construed differently in the two most prominent strategies of analysis we find in physical science and engineering today: (1) atomistic, reductive analysis and (2) Systems analysis. Correspondingly, atomism is the conception according to which the simplest (smallest) indivisible entity of a certain kind is most fundamental; while systemism , as will be articulated here, is the conception according to which the bonds that structure wholes are most …Read more
  •  90
    The Reduction of Causal Processes
    Synthese 131 (1): 99-128. 2002.
    The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs to the stream is a cause of the adjoining event downstream of it. I shall propose modifications to this …Read more
  •  36
    Two Dogmas of Naturalized Epistemology
    Dialectica 53 (2): 111-138. 1999.
    This essay is not concerned exclusively with procedure. In addition to developing and promoting an alternative methodology, I will also be utilizing it to defend, systematically, an unfashionable proposition nowadays. This is the proposition that the question of how a particular judgment, on a particular occasion, is to be justified, is independent of the question of how that judgment comes to be formed by the individual who forms it. This thesis, which I shall call j‐in‐dependence, is deplored …Read more
  •  12
    Philosophy in the age of science
    Metascience 28 (1): 51-53. 2019.
  •  39
    Solidarity: A Motivational Conception
    Philosophical Papers 41 (1): 57-95. 2012.
    Abstract This essay offers a motivational conception of solidarity that can be employed across the entire range of sciences and humanities, while also filling a gap in the motivational spectrum conceived by decision theorists and economists?and expanding the two-part division between altruistic and selfish motivations into a tripartite analysis that suggests a spectrum instead. According to the present proposal, solidarity is a condition of action-readiness on behalf of a group or its interests.…Read more
  •  57
    Molecule-for-Molecule Duplication
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 103-114. 2008.
  •  8
    On Planning: Toward a Natural History of Goal
    Philosophical Papers 37 (2): 289-317. 2008.
    The goal of the essay is to articulate some beginnings for an empirical approach to the study of agency, in the firm conviction that agency is subject to scientific scrutiny, and is not to be abandoned to high-brow aprioristic philosophy. Drawing on insights from decision analysis, game theory, general dynamics, physics and engineering, this essay will examine the diversity of planning phenomena, and in that way take some steps towards assembling rudiments for the budding science, in the process…Read more
  •  74
    The Monist 92 (3): 452-478. 2009.
    Dynamical-systems analysis is nowadays ubiquitous. From engineering (its point of origin and natural home) to physiology, and from psychology to ecology, it enjoys surprisingly wide application. Sometimes the analysis rings decisively false—as, for example, when adopted in certain treatments of historical narrative;1 other times it is provocativeandcontroversial,aswhenappliedtothephenomenaofmind and cognition.2 Dynamical systems analysis (or “Systems” with a capital “S,” as I shall sometimes ref…Read more
  •  49
    Of Human Bonding: An Essay on the Natural History of Agency
    with Chrisoula Andreou
    Public Reason 1 (2). 2009.
  •  9
    Knowledge in an Age of Individual Economy: A Prolegomenon to Epistemology
    Journal of Philosophical Research 24 169-191. 1999.
    This essay identifies foundational questions, all metaphysical in character, which must be answered before the enterprise of epistemology proper can begin to prosper, and in the process draws attention to fundamental conflicts between the demands of epistemology and the demands of prudence. It concludes that knowledge is not, as such, a directive of prudence, and thus that the enterprise of knowledge does not fall under the category of what is practically required.