Mariela Aguilera

Self-location is a crucial element of self-consciousness. It is also a constitutive part of our experience as spatial beings. Philosophers often claim that both elements are exclusive to conceptual creatures with linguistic skills. However, more basic non-conceptual forms of spatial experience deserve to be elucidated. Based on Bermudez’s account of a non-conceptual point of view, I will argue for an integrative account of self-location in non-human animals. To develop my argument, I will focus on practical reasoning. Particularly, I will argue that navigation re-presents a case of practical reasoning that requires dominating an allocentric frame of reference –specifically, cognitive maps.

There has been considerable debate among scholars as to whether maps can play an inferential role. The debate has focused on whether maps possess the representational format required for logical transitions. This paper addresses a distinct challenge, namely whether maps can satisfy the taking condition, which has been proposed as a necessary condition for inference. In doing so, the focus of the discussion is slightly shifted by analyzing not only the representational structure of maps but also the rational transitions within them. Given that one of the main reasons for the use of maps is navigation, a dynamic notion of inference is proposed which takes into account practical reasoning. According to this view, logical theoretical inferences are just one type of many different kinds of inferential processes.

To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck draws on an apparent dichotomy between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems.