Mario Garcia

The effect of ASDEX Upgrade edge localized mode -mitigation coils on fast ion wall loads was studied with the fast particle following Monte Carlo code ASCOT. Neutral beam injected particles were simulated in two AUG discharges both in the presence and in the absence of the magnetic field perturbation induced by the eight newly installed in-vessel coils. In one of the discharges beams were applied individually, making it a useful basis for investigating the effect of the coils on different beams. However, no ELM mitigation was observed in #26476, probably due to the low plasma density. Therefore, another discharge demonstrating clear ELM mitigation was also studied. The magnetic perturbation due to the in-vessel coils has a significant effect on the fast particle confinement, but only when total magnetic field, B tot, is low. When B tot was high, the perturbation did not increase the losses, but merely resulted in redistribution of the wall power loads. Hence, it seems to be possible to achieve ELM mitigation using in-vessel coils, while still avoiding increased fast ion losses, by simply using a strong B tot. Preliminary comparisons between simulated and experimental fast ion lost detector signals show a reasonable correspondence. © 2012 IAEA, Vienna.

Hacemos una lectura del “Tratado sobre los principios de la teología” de Guillermo de Occam, y echamos un vistazo a la Escolástica tardía que esta obra representa tan bien, revisando diferentes referencias bibliográficas, que me han permitido conocer y analizar diferentes conceptos y enfoques acerca de este singular tema. De hecho, se trata de una obra mayor, de gran calibre, pero de autor incierto, generalmente atribuida a Occam, aunque la autoría real está en disputa. Lo cierto es que se trata de un momento culminante de una época de la historia del pensamiento occidental; una en la que su autor, con briosa arquitectura, levanta un edificio que perenniza el pensar occamista, comentándolo, glosándolo y dándole forma enciclopédica, minuciosa, como la que uno esperaría encontrar en un diccionario o un manual del Nominalismo naciente.

Este artículo expone el resultado de la puesta en práctica de una metodología docente novedosa a través de la que se busca superar las dificultades que el proceso de enseñanza/aprendizaje encuentra en las asignaturas jurídicas que forman parte de los grados universitarios no jurídicos. Comienza destacando el papel que tienen las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación en dicho proceso y, significativamente, el campus virtual. Seguidamente, desgrana cada uno de los elementos de la metodología docente aplicaba, entre los que encuentra la gamificación. Concluye con la determinación de las consecuencias de la experiencia desarrollada.

The essential role of creativity has been highlighted in several human knowledge areas. Regarding the neural underpinnings of creativity, there is evidence about the role of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) on divergent thinking (DT) and convergent thinking (CT). Transcranial stimulation studies suggest that the left DLPFC is associated with both DT and CT, whereas left IFG is more related to DT. However, none of the previous studies have targeted both hubs simultaneously and compared transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and random noise stimulation (tRNS). Additionally, given the relationship between cognitive flexibility and creativity, we included it in order to check if the improvement in creativity may be mediated by cognitive flexibility. In this double-blind, between-subjects study, 66 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (N = 22) that received a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS), or sham for 20 min. The tDCS group received 1.5 mA with the anode over the left DLPFC and cathode over the left IFG. Locations in tRNS group were the same and they received 1.5 mA of high frequency tRNS (100–500 Hz). Divergent thinking was assessed before (baseline) and during stimulation with unusual uses (UU) and picture completion (PC) subtests from Torrance Creative thinking Test, whereas convergent thinking was evaluated with the remote association test (RAT). Stroop test was included to assess cognitive flexibility. ANCOVA results of performance under stimulation (controlling for baseline performance) showed that there were significant differences in PC (F = 3.35, p = 0.042, np2 = 0.10) but not in UU (F = 0.61, p = 0.546) and RAT (F = 2.65, p = 0.079) scores. Post-hoc analyses showed that tRNS group had significantly higher scores compared to sham (p = 0.004) in PC. More specifically, tRNS showed higher performance in fluency (p = 0.012) and originality (p = 0.021) dimensions of PC compared to sham. Regarding cognitive flexibility, we did not find any significant effect of any of the stimulation groups (F = 0.34, p = 0.711). Therefore, no further mediation analyses were performed. Finally, the group that received tDCS reported more adverse effects than sham group (F = 3.46, p = 0.035). Altogether, these results suggest that tRNS may have some advantages over tDCS in DT.

En este trabajo defenderé la factibilidad de una ciencia jurídica trascendental de las críticas que Jan Sieckmann y Christoph Kletzer han hecho a su carácter constitutivo. Sieckmann argumenta que las propias premisas de la teoría pura del derecho desembocan en una disciplina sin objeto de estudio, mientras Kletzer sostiene que el acto constitutivo se da realmente en la aplicación del derecho. De mi defensa se deriva una exégesis de la relación entre filosofía del derecho, ciencia jurídica y derecho positivo conforme al modelo kantiano de la conexión entre la crítica de la razón pura, la ciencia física y los fenómenos naturales.

It has been recently argued, by Stanley L. Paulson, that the transcendental argument Kelsen offers to ground the unicity of his explanation of the normativity of the law fails to do its job. Having dismissed iusnaturalism and fact-based legal positivism, Kelsen is unable to produce a conclusive argument in favour of his pure theory of law, since it is always possible to come up with a new type of theory different from those doctrines by mixing up their central tenets. So, according to Paulson, the transcendental aspirations of the pure theory are to be abandoned. This result has lead him to find new interpretations for the a priori categories that make up the Neo-Kantian apparatus present in Kelsen’s work, with special attention to the basic norm, given that it stands at the centre of Kelsen’s explanation of such notions as validity, obligation, empowerment and so on.I propose to show that Paulson’s critique on Kelsen’s transcendental argument is not so devastating as it might seem at first sight. I design an strategy that answers Paulson’s challenge and preserves the force of Kelsen’s argument. I then reject, based on textual evidence, his two alternative interpretations of the basic norm. Lastly, I examine the influence on Kelsen of the Marburg Neo-Kantians, specially of its leading figure, Hermann Cohen, to underlie the transcendental import of the basic norm. My conclusion is that, what I call Kelsen’s transcendental normativism, is up and running despite Paulson’s farewell.

El propósito central de este ensayo es mostrar que el debate actual entre el positivismo excluyente y el incluyente se alimenta de, al menos, tres ideas equivocadas acerca de la relación entre el lenguaje jurídico y el moral, la vinculación entre la ciencia y la práctica del derecho y la concepción de lo que es una ciencia normativa. Expuestos estos errores, esbozo una propuesta para entender estas relaciones, fundada en la concepción neokantiana-kelseniana de la ciencia jurídica. De esta doctrina derivo que el lenguaje jurídico y la ciencia del derecho son, respectivamente, el fundamento conceptual del discurso moral y de la práctica jurídica. Asimismo, rechazo la definición que ve en el carácter normativo de la ciencia jurídica la presencia de juicios de valor. En consecuencia, el debate entre el positivismo incluyente y el excluyente debe ser abandonado o, al menos, reformulado.

El propósito central de este ensayo es proponer que entre la democracia y el liberalismo existe una relación pragmática. Para ello primero rechazaré la tesis de que este nexo es de tipo lógico-conceptual, así como la idea de que se trata meramente de un nexo contingente, para lo cual retomaré las concepciones de John Stuart Mill y Hans Kelsen. En suma, lo que sostendré es que los modelos democráticos, en tanto métodos de creación normativa, no implican ni las libertades políticas ni las económicas, aunque sí hay lo que llamaré una relación pragmática entre la democracia y el liberalismo, por lo que ser demócrata y antiliberal, o liberal y no demócrata, es una contradicción performativa.