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26Consciousness without Report: Insights from Summary Statistics and Inattention ‘Blindness’Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373 (1755). 2018.We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such co…Read more
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1When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptionsFrontiers in Psychology 14. 2023.In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should…Read more
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11A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for MisrepresentationMind and Language 16 (3): 311-334. 2001.A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined vi…Read more
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82Causal Responsibility and Robust CausationFrontiers in Psychology 11 1069. 2020.How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor -- the robustness of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome -- influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustn…Read more
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15A PDP approach to set size effects within the Stroop task: Reply to Kanne, Balota, Spieler, and Faust (1998)Psychological Review 105 (1): 188-194. 1998.
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30Neural mechanism for the magical number 4: Competitive interactions and nonlinear oscillationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1): 151-152. 2001.The aim of our commentary is to strengthen Cowan's proposal for an inherent capacity limitation in STM by suggesting a neurobiological mechanism based on competitive networks and nonlinear oscillations that avoids some of the shortcomings of the scheme discussed in the target article (Lisman & Idiart 1995).
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8Postscript: Contrasting predictions for preference reversalPsychological Review 117 (4): 1291-1293. 2010.
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21Value certainty in drift-diffusion models of preferential choicePsychological Review 130 (3): 790-806. 2023.
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30Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 95 (C): 103212. 2021.
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15Examining the mechanisms underlying contextual preference reversal: Comment on Trueblood, Brown, and Heathcote (2014)Psychological Review 122 (4): 838-847. 2015.
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567Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for OverflowMind and Language 34 (4): 423-444. 2019.The question of whether conscious experience is restricted by cognitive access and exhausted by report, or whether it overflows it—comprising more information than can be reported—is hotly debated. Recently, we provided evidence in favor of Overflow, showing that observers discriminated the color‐diversity (CD) of letters in an array, while their working‐memory and attention were dedicated to encoding and reporting a set of cued letters. An alternative interpretation is that CD‐discriminations d…Read more
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506Agency, Teleological Control and Robust CausationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2): 302-324. 2018.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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12An appeal against the item's death sentence: Accounting for diagnostic data patterns with an item-based model of visual searchBehavioral and Brain Sciences 40. 2017.
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17Task conflict and proactive control: A computational theory of the Stroop taskPsychological Review 125 (1): 59-82. 2018.
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16Short-term memory after all: Comment on Sederberg, Howard, and Kahana (2008)Psychological Review 115 (4): 1108-1116. 2008.
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19Disentangling decision models: From independence to competitionPsychological Review 120 (1): 1-38. 2013.
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94Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Mind and Language 19 (2): 241-248. 2004.The merit of the SINBAD model is to provide an explicit mechanism showing how the cortex may come to develop detectors responding to correlated properties and therefore corresponding to the sources of these correlations. Here I argue that, contrary to the article, SINBAD neurosemantics does not need to rely on teleofunctions to solve the problem of misrepresentation. A number of difficulties for the teleofunction theories of content are reviewed and an alternative theory based on categorization …Read more
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26The Demise of Short-Term Memory Revisited: Empirical and Computational Investigations of Recency EffectsPsychological Review 112 (1): 3-42. 2005.
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26The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions, and preference reversalIn Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. pp. 277--300. 2008.
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32A Neural Network Model for Attribute‐Based Decision ProcessesCognitive Science 17 (3): 349-396. 1993.We propose a neural model of multiattribute-decision processes, based on an attractor neural network with dynamic thresholds. The model may be viewed as a generalization of the elimination by aspects model, whereby simultaneous selection of several aspects is allowed. Depending on the amount of synaptic inhibition, various kinds of scanning strategies may be performed, leading in some cases to vacillations among the alternatives. The model predicts that decisions of a longer time duration exhibi…Read more
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26Dynamics of decision-making: from evidence accumulation to preference and beliefFrontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
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19The role of the frontal cortex in memory: an investigation of the Von Restorff effectFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 8. 2014.
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The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions and preference reversalIn Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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518A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentationMind and Language 16 (3): 331-334. 2001.A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined vi…Read more
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43We See More Than We Can Report “Cost Free” Color Phenomenality Outside Focal AttentionPsychological Science 25 (7): 1394-1403. 2014.The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and working memory system: We see more than we can report. According to the opposed view, this perceived richness is an illusion—we are aware only of information that we can subsequently report. This debate remains unresolved because of the inevitable reliance on report, which is limited in capacity. To bypa…Read more
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12Loss Aversion and Inhibition in Dynamical Models of Multialternative ChoicePsychological Review 111 (3): 757-769. 2004.
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18'Tis all in pieces (separate RFs and CFs), all coherence goneBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 693-694. 1997.We argue that the separation between CF (contextual field) and RF (receptive field) in relation to the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) system is empirically questionable and that it is functionally unnecessary. In addition, the proposed suppression of unexpected information will in many cases be counterproductive.